By Bill Emmott
There is little doubt that in 2014, Vladimir Putin felt insulted when then-US President Barack Obama described Russia simply as “a Regional power that is threatening some neighboring states, not because of its strength, but because of its weakness.”
And yet, eleven years later, and three years after Putin’s attempted full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Obama’s comment rings truer than ever. The problem is that both Putin and President Donald Trump are acting as if Russia were strong, not weak.
The war figures show otherwise. According to new estimates released by the British Ministry of Defense, as of February 2022, the Russian army has lost nine hundred thousand people, of whom 200-250 thousand were killed and the rest seriously wounded.
Russia is dedicating 40 percent of the federal budget to its armed forces, which accounts for 8 percent of the country’s entire Gross Domestic Product.
However, all these losses and all this money have only brought Russia control of about 20 percent of Ukraine’s territory, and there have been no advances inside Ukraine in the past three months. Russia’s only recent success has been the withdrawal of Ukrainian soldiers from the Kursk Region near the border, which Ukraine occupied last August, and this largely happened only after Trump cut off Ukraine from U.S. intelligence support. Ukrainian soldiers have not yet been completely driven out of Kursk.
The Russian economy has proven capable of withstanding the prolonged failure of Putin’s war, but that doesn’t mean the country is strong. Sales of oil, gas, and other products to China, India, and other clients have kept the economy afloat, but Russian banks have been forced to provide subsidized loans to the defense, construction, and agriculture sectors. This situation, however, does nothing but prepare the ground for more trouble in the future.
To keep inflation under control, the Central Bank of Russia has raised interest rates to 21 percent, stressing that without subsidized loans, the entire economy would be paralyzed and many loan beneficiaries would head toward bankruptcy.
The truth is that the war was started by an authoritarian leader who used the only weapons at his disposal: military might and nationalist rhetoric. Now, in 2025, the truth is emerging: despite the failure, Putin may not want to stop the war, because if spending on the war effort were to stop, or even slow down, the Russian economy would face serious problems.
Eleven years ago, Obama was right in his judgment but wrong in his reaction: if he had responded with determination and force to Putin’s aggression, together with his European allies, Russia might have been repelled. But he chose to impose negligible and mild sanctions, continue buying Russian gas, and invest in new pipelines, all of which ended up encouraging Putin to continue his path of threats that culminated in the disastrous invasion.
This strange balance between Putin’s personal strength and Russia’s national weakness is precisely what both Trump and European leaders would do well to keep in mind. So far, Trump appears to be repeating the mistakes of Obama and Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2014: in his one-on-one talks with Putin on March 18, as well as in meetings between his foreign policy people and Russian officials in Saudi Arabia and Moscow, Trump has sought to persuade Putin to accept a ceasefire, rather than force him to do so.
Here’s where all of Trump’s talk of “extraordinary economic deals” ends: he is suggesting—most likely with Putin’s own encouragement—that if peace is achieved, there will be economic benefits of all kinds for both America and Russia. The story of the Nord Stream pipeline under the Baltic Sea is being repeated: the illusion that the Russian bear can be tamed only by feeding it plenty.
And yet, neither Putin himself nor the former KGB officials close to him need additional sustenance: they are already rich beyond all desire. As long as Putin’s grip on power remains strong, they have little to worry about the Russian economy. To the extent that they worry, they have only one interest: to continue the war, because that is where the economy and employment are already largely oriented.
Putin will not be tempted to make peace.
He does not need to fall prey to the lure of “deals,” nor be interested in the talks already underway between German, Italian, and other European companies about resuming Russian gas purchases once peace is achieved. Trump’s attempt to lure him and the Europeans’ discussions about gas purchases will only convince him that his Western opponents are weak and corrupt – just as he has always said.
Unfortunately, a lasting peace can most likely only be achieved through pressure, not enticement. It remains to be seen whether Trump and his advisers will understand this, and whether they will be willing to really put pressure on Putin by resuming military aid to Ukraine and implementing the “massive sanctions” on Russia that Trump has threatened to impose but has given no sign of defining, much less implementing.
Meanwhile, all of this confirms the central theme of our era: the real burden falls on Europe. To put pressure on a strong Putin and a weak Russia, we must adapt an old saying and “put money and troops where we talk,” that is, do more than just talk about the problem.
Rightly so, Great Britain, France, Poland and other countries are drawing up long-term plans to defend Europe without American help over the coming decades.
The European Commission is also drawing up long-term plans to enable member states to take on new debt to invest in defense. But the resistance to Putin’s lure shows that the biggest challenges are short-term ones: strengthening Ukraine’s resistance today and proving Europe’s ability to provide the people and means to guarantee security tomorrow.
When Chancellor Friedrich Merz officially takes office, he could make a significant first contribution by authorizing the transfer of German long-range Taurus missiles to Ukraine, which his predecessor had refused. Next, the triumvirate of Germany, France, and Great Britain must unveil concrete and credible plans for sending troops and air forces to Ukraine, showing that they are ready to be on the ground immediately after a ceasefire is signed.
Only by giving an immediate demonstration of force can the Russian bear truly be tamed.