The main radioactive danger today comes from the Bushehr reactor. Within a radius of 200 kilometers from the plant, on the coast of the Persian Gulf, are Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. With a medium capacity (almost one gigawatt), the plant is managed jointly with Russia, which supplies fuel and has provided about 200 technicians. “It should never be touched. It would be a very big problem from the point of view of nuclear safety for the future,” warns Grossi.
Reactors, centrifuges, enriched uranium. Bombs on Iranian nuclear facilities do not only create rubble. “There is a lot of nuclear material in Iran, scattered in several places. The risk of an accident that could cause the release of radioactivity into the atmosphere is real,” warned the director of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), Rafael Grossi, yesterday.
Let’s take the news announced yesterday morning by Israel, which – fortunately – turned out to be false: the bombing of the Iranian nuclear power plant in Bushehr. “An attack on an active nuclear facility would cause a radioactive catastrophe,” comments James Acton, co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, an American institute. Attention remains focused on Fordow, a bunker 100 meters deep underground near the city of Qom, a few kilometers south of Tehran. There are about two thousand centrifuges for enriching uranium, at a depth that only special “bunker buster” bombs can reach. “The discussion is whether or not the US will decide to bomb Fordow,” confirms Edwin Lyman, director of Nuclear Security at the American non-profit group Union of Concerned Scientists.
“Unlike an active nuclear power plant, uranium enrichment facilities pose a greater risk of contamination in the event of a bombardment,” explains Marco Enrico Ricotti, professor of Nuclear Plants at the Polytechnic of Milan and director of a master’s program.
The main radioactive danger today comes from the Bushehr reactor. Within a radius of 200 kilometers from the plant, on the coast of the Persian Gulf, are Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. With a medium capacity (almost one gigawatt), the plant is managed jointly with Russia, which supplies fuel and has provided about 200 technicians. “It should never be touched. It would be a very big problem from the point of view of nuclear safety for the future,” Grossi warned. “Hitting it would cause severe contamination, but I do not believe that Israel has included it among its targets.”
“A nuclear power plant like this, which produces electricity for the country, does not enter the process of building a bomb,” confirms Alessandro Dodaro, director of the Nuclear Department of ENEA (National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and Sustainable Development). “A plant for civil purposes uses low-enriched uranium. Extracting the spent fuel and converting it into material for a bomb is a complex process. Iran does not possess the necessary technology.”
The case of the plant under construction in Arak, bombed yesterday morning, is different: “There was no radioactive material yet,” says Dodaro, “but the plant could have produced fuel for a nuclear weapon.” After the destruction of Arak, the only way left for Iran to achieve the construction of a nuclear weapon is through centrifuges, which separate uranium isotopes: uranium 235 (needed for the weapon) and uranium 238 (more common, which is discarded). To be used in a weapon, uranium must be concentrated to over 90%.
The first stage of enrichment takes place at a plant in Isfahan, 300 km south of Tehran, which has been bombed several times since the start of the conflict. There, powdered uranium is converted into uranium hexafluoride gas. “This is the gas that is fed into centrifuges to obtain enriched uranium,” explains Ricotti. “It is toxic if inhaled or swallowed, but its radioactivity is weak. It is heavy and does not disperse in the air. In the event of a bombardment, the risk of contamination is limited to the plant personnel, who can use gas masks.” It was this gas that caused the radiological and chemical contamination at Natanz, after the bombardment of June 13. “The contamination occurred only inside the plant. There was no radiation leakage outside,” explained Grossi. The IAEA speaks of a limited risk, even though the amount of uranium available to Iran is considerable: “About 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%,” explains Ricotti. “Even if Fordow were to be bombed, we don’t expect serious consequences,” Acton adds. “But that doesn’t mean the US wouldn’t bomb it. Quite the opposite.”