Oil, narcoterrorism and Washington’s secret calculations: why Maduro has become the new node of the global crisis. What is hidden behind the triple game: the blow to Maduro, the war for oil and the internal battles in Washington
According to several US officials, the administration has drawn up several options for a military intervention in Venezuela, including direct attacks on units supporting President Nicolás Maduro, as well as measures to seize control of the country’s oil fields. Trump has not yet made a decision on how, or if, he will act. Officials emphasize that he does not want to approve operations that could endanger US troops or result in an embarrassing failure.
However, many of his advisers are pushing for one of the most aggressive options: toppling Maduro. They have asked the Justice Department for guidance to provide a legal basis for military action that goes beyond attacks on ships accused by Washington, without evidence, of being involved in drug trafficking. The guidance could create a legal framework that would allow the United States to strike Maduro without needing congressional authorization for the use of military force. The legal guidance is still being drafted, but according to some officials, the argument that is expected to be supported is that Maduro and the leaders of the security apparatus are central figures of the Los Soles cartel, which the United States classifies as a narcoterrorist group. The Justice Department could conclude that this categorization makes the Venezuelan president a legitimate target, despite US law prohibiting the assassination of leaders of other countries.
The Justice Department declined to comment. Trying to justify a strike against Maduro would be another step by the US administration to expand its legal powers. Washington has already carried out targeted killings of suspected drug traffickers, who until September were usually prosecuted and arrested at sea, rather than eliminated by drone strikes. Any operation aimed at toppling Maduro would expose the administration to even stricter scrutiny of the legal basis for its actions, especially given the vague justifications used so far: drug trafficking, US interest in Venezuelan oil, and Trump’s claims that Maduro has been releasing prisoners to be sent to the US border.
Trump has made a series of complicated and often contradictory statements about the goals, objectives, and potential legitimacy of military action. He has announced that attacks on ships in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, where more than seventy people have died so far, would be expanded to include land targets. But this expansion has not yet taken place.
On November 3, when CBS News asked him if the United States was heading for war against Venezuela, he replied: “I don’t believe so. I don’t think so, but they’ve treated us very badly, and not just on the drug issue.” Trump repeated his unsubstantiated accusation that Maduro has opened prisons and psychiatric institutions to send people associated with the Tren de Aragua criminal gang to the United States. When asked if Maduro’s days in power were numbered, he replied: “I believe so.”
PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE
Among the main proponents of the more aggressive options are Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who also serves as acting national security adviser, and Stephen Miller, the deputy chief of staff and national security adviser. Rubio and Miller, in private conversations, argue that Maduro should be forced from power. According to his associates, Trump has expressed some reservations, partly out of fear that the operation could fail. The president has not rushed to make a decision and has sought to know what the concrete benefits would be for the United States, focusing especially on the possibility that Washington would secure some of Venezuela’s oil.
“President Trump has sent a clear message to Maduro: stop sending drugs and criminals into our country,” said White House spokeswoman Anna Kelly. “The president has been clear that he will continue to target narco-terrorists involved in drug trafficking. Anything else is speculation and should be treated as such.”
Trump is expected to make a decision after the arrival of the giant aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford in the Caribbean on November 11, carrying about 5,000 sailors and more than 75 fighter and support aircraft, including F/A-18s. Since late August, the number of US troops in the Region has increased. Even without the aircraft carrier, there are about 10,000 soldiers in the area, stationed on warships and at US bases in Puerto Rico. In recent weeks, the Pentagon has sent B-52 and B-1 bombers from bases in Louisiana and Texas on flying missions off the Venezuelan coast, which the military describes as a “show of force.” The B-52 can carry dozens of precision bombs, while the B-1s have a payload capacity of 34,000 kilograms of ammunition.
The 160th Special Operations Airborne Regiment, known for its extensive counterterrorism missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, has also recently conducted exercises near Venezuelan waters. This rapid and open deployment of forces suggests a campaign of psychological pressure on Maduro. Trump has mentioned the possibility of approving a document that would give the CIA authorization for covert operations in Venezuela, a move that presidents rarely make publicly.
If Trump were to order a ground intervention in Venezuela, he would expose himself to enormous military, legal, and political risks. Although he authorized the bombing of three nuclear facilities in Iran in June, the goal was not to overthrow the regime in Tehran. In Venezuela, there would be no guarantee of success, much less that overthrowing Maduro would bring about a government more friendly to the United States. According to his aides, far more energy has been devoted to planning an attack on Maduro’s government than to what would happen next, if the operation were successful. Some of Trump’s most committed political allies have warned him against launching such an operation, reminding him that he was elected to end “endless wars,” not to start new ones.
A THREE-PHASE PLAN
The CIA could undertake several types of activities: intelligence missions, support for the creation of an internal opposition, active sabotage of the government or even the capture of Maduro. However, according to some American security officials, if such operations had a real chance of removing the Venezuelan president, this would have happened years ago. It is for this reason that the White House is considering the possibility of military intervention. Three proposals are on the table.
The first phase involves airstrikes on military installations, some of which are linked to drug trafficking, with the aim of weakening the military’s support for Maduro. If the Venezuelan president were to believe he no longer has the protection of the armed forces, he could try to flee. Critics warn that such a move could have the opposite effect: strengthening popular support for a leader who is already under siege.
The second option involves using US special forces, such as Delta Force or Seal Team 6, to arrest or eliminate Maduro. The Trump administration would try to circumvent the legal ban on assassinating foreign heads of state by arguing that Maduro is, above all, the head of a narcoterrorist cartel; an argument similar to that used to justify airstrikes on ships accused of drug trafficking. The State Department has put up a $50 million reward for Maduro’s arrest or conviction, a significant increase compared to the $25 million offered by the Biden administration. The White House could also support the idea that, due to the repression of the opposition and the manipulation of recent elections, Maduro is no longer a legitimate leader of the state.
The third, more complex option would involve deploying U.S. counterterrorism forces to seize control of airports and some of Venezuela’s key oil fields and strategic infrastructure. The latter two options carry significant risks to U.S. forces on the ground, not to mention the obvious danger to civilians, especially if the objective were to capture or neutralize Maduro within an urban environment, such as Caracas.
Trump has been reluctant to consider operations that put the lives of American soldiers at risk. For this reason, many of the plans being considered envisage the use of naval drones and long-range weapons.
THE OIL DILEMMA
The US president is interested in Venezuela’s vast oil reserves, the largest in the world. The management of those resources has been an unresolved issue for the administration for ten months, which has not decided whether to cut off US imports or maintain them, hoping to maintain a privileged position in the event of Maduro’s overthrow. Even after Trump doubled the reward for the Venezuelan leader’s capture and called him a “narco-terrorist”, he canceled, and then renewed, the license that allows Chevron, the US oil giant, to continue operations in the Latin American country.
Under pressure from Secretary of State Rubio, Chevron’s license was revoked in March, and Venezuelan exports to the United States fell sharply over the summer. A new license, the details of which have not been made public, appears to prohibit the company from transferring foreign currency into the Venezuelan banking system. However, Chevron’s oil exports continue to be an important economic support for Maduro. Chevron is an exception: most of the assets of other American oil companies operating in Venezuela were confiscated or transferred to the control of Venezuelan state enterprises years ago. Chevron is one of the few that has managed to maneuver between Trump and Maduro, who has declared: “Chevron has been in Venezuela for 102 years and I want to stay for another hundred.” The company has hired a prominent lobbyist in Washington, a major donor to Trump’s campaign.
In recent months, Maduro has tried to woo Trump by offering concessions, including a dominant stake in the country’s oil and other mineral resources. He has promised American companies preferential contracts for current and future projects related to gold and oil. He has even suggested that he is willing to reorient exports to China and limit cooperation with Chinese, Iranian and Russian companies.
In early October, Trump rejected the offer, and the American military escalation accelerated significantly.
If the Maduro regime were to fall and be replaced by a stable, more Washington-friendly leadership, Chevron would be among the main beneficiaries of what the Trump administration envisions as a boom in investment in Venezuela’s colossal oil reserves. The idea intrigued Trump, as did control of Syrian fields, even though their reserves are much more limited. “We believe our presence remains a stabilizing factor for the local economy, the Region and the energy security of the United States,” said Bill Turenne, a Chevron spokesman. As Trump’s aides push for a more aggressive military option, Justice Department lawyers are drafting a legal framework covering all the mooted actions. White House officials have requested an updated legal analysis before taking further steps, and government lawyers have told members of Congress that the president does not need their authorization for lethal strikes against ships coming from Venezuela.
Elliot Gaiser, director of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, told lawmakers that the government’s interpretation is that the operations against the Venezuelan ships do not constitute a hostile act within the meaning of the 1973 War Powers Resolution, which requires congressional authorization for military action lasting more than sixty days. But both Democrats and Republicans have expressed concern about the attacks.
SEARCH FOR A LEGAL BASIS
Perhaps the closest precedent for justifying a strike on a head of state is an opinion prepared by the same office during Trump’s first term. According to it, the president had the authority to order the missile strike that killed General Qassem Soleimani, the top Iranian intelligence and security figure who was killed by US drones in 2020. Trump has described that operation as one of the major achievements of his term. In that case, the legal office assessed that the use of drones was justified because Soleimani “was actively developing plans for new attacks against US military and diplomatic personnel,” according to a memo released after the attack.
“Military leaders planning and directing attacks against U.S. citizens or interests may be considered legitimate military targets,” the document said. The memorandum emphasized that the operation was designed “to avoid civilian casualties or significant collateral damage” and that it was not intended “to impose by military means a change in the political nature of the regime.” The document concluded that, “given the nature of the mission, the available intelligence information, and the measures taken to avoid escalation,” a drone strike on him “would not constitutionally be considered an act of war.” (The New York Times)