Turkey, which has become one of the most important sources of influence in the Syrian presidential palace, has begun helping al-Sharaa build a national army. It has pledged to supply it with weapons and, according to Turkish sources, aims to build factories for the production of military equipment in Syria, in addition to investing in construction and infrastructure.
US President Donald Trump praised Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman during his visit to Riyadh last May, saying: “I like him a lot. So we give him a lot, a lot. I love him a lot.” Bin Salman did not respond with the same enthusiasm, but he is known for his large gifts. The most important was a promise to invest over a trillion dollars in the US during Trump’s term. In return, the Saudi prince “received” a historic handshake between Trump and Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa, with the promise of lifting sanctions on Syria since 2011. On Monday, Trump followed through on the promise by signing an executive order lifting sanctions on “entities critical to Syria’s development, the functioning of its government and the rebuilding of its social fabric,” according to the US Treasury Department.
The lifting of sanctions will enable Syria to begin a long process of economic recovery, allowing the signing of agreements with foreign countries and investors that were previously prohibited, except for humanitarian aid.
This step will also allow the return of millions of citizens who have been displaced from their homes. According to conservative estimates, Syria will need investments of 250 to 300 billion dollars for reconstruction. Part of the funds will come from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey, while the rest will come from international financial institutions in the form of grants and loans over the coming decades. With the lifting of sanctions, Syria is gaining the status of the “land of opportunity” in the Middle East, and this is not just about Ahmad al-Sharaa. Turkey has already begun the process of returning Syrian refugees, over three million of whom live on its territory. Egypt hopes to supply Syria with gas, while Qatar has announced plans to deliver gas through an Arab pipeline running through Jordan. Jordan wants to sell electricity to Syria and through it to Lebanon.
Iraq and Lebanon are considering the possibility of rebuilding and operating an oil pipeline from Kirkuk through Syria to Tripoli. Lebanon plans to repatriate more than a million and a half Syrian refugees, resume land trade routes with Syria, Jordan and the Gulf States, and rebuild the banking system in Syria.
At the same time, oil companies, mainly American, hope to develop oil fields in northern Syria, currently under the control of the Syrian Kurds. Under an agreement between al-Sharaa and Kurdish leader Mazloum Abdi, these fields will come under state control.
This economic wealth, currently theoretical, will face challenges and diplomatic-political conflicts that will determine Syria’s chances of becoming a Regional hub. The main challenges are expected to be the agreements that Syria will sign with Israel and Turkey’s role in them. Since the fall of the Assad regime, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has demanded that Israel stop military operations in Syrian airspace and withdraw from the territory it has taken in the eastern part of the Golan Heights and southern Syria. The possibility of a violent clash between Turkey and Israel, which peaked last April when Israel attacked Syrian bases near areas that Turkey planned to use as its own bases, has diminished. With the mediation of Azerbaijan, the two countries have established a joint mechanism for military coordination, but suspicions and tensions have not disappeared.
Turkey, which has become one of the most important sources of influence in the Syrian presidential palace, has begun helping al-Sharaa build a national army. It has pledged to supply it with weapons and, according to Turkish sources, intends to build factories for the production of military equipment in Syria, in addition to investments in construction and infrastructure.
The possibility of Syria joining the Abraham Accords following the signing of “interim agreements” for security coordination between Israel and Syria is being discussed in public opinion and the media, which is causing concern in Ankara. Turkey fears that Israel will eventually take control of Syrian territories and normalize relations with the Druze minority, most of whom live in southern Syria.
There is also concern about the creation of “patronage relations” between Israel and the Kurdish minority in northern Syria. “Erdogan is starting to realize that he may lose his status as the sole owner who determines the movements of al-Sharaa,” a former Turkish diplomat told Haaretz. “At the same time, he understands that he cannot clash for the time being with President Trump’s policy, which promotes a consensual system of relations between Syria and Israel.” “It is important to remember that this movement is supported by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which helped Erdogan get out of the economic crisis in Turkey, where they invested billions of dollars, and may seek political gain in Syria,” the former diplomat says. He thinks this context explains the recent change in Erdogan’s rhetoric, which has dropped its opposition to the normalization of relations between Syria and Israel.
“In exchange, he expects some appropriate compensation from Trump,” the Turkish diplomat notes.
This could include Turkey’s return to the F-35 fighter jet development and production project, from which it was excluded in 2020 as a sanction after purchasing the Russian S-400 radar system. The possibility was discussed this week by the US ambassador to Ankara, Tom Barrack, who is also Trump’s special envoy for Syria and Lebanon. In an interview with the Turkish news agency Anadolu, Barrack said he believes Trump and Erdogan will order US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to find a solution by the end of this year. Turkey has also suggested taking responsibility for the fight against ISIS in Syria, instead of the Kurdish forces that are currently carrying it out, “freeing” the US from supporting and financing the Syrian Kurdish forces.
This issue has caused great tension in relations between the two countries. According to Turkish diplomats, “The web of interests that Syria now imposes on Erdogan surrounds him between hostility towards and concerns for Israel, and the ambition to become the main actor influencing Trump’s policies in the Middle East and beyond.”
“The positive outcome could be the improvement and rehabilitation of Turkish-Israeli relations, in exchange for the diplomatic benefits he gets from his close relationship with Trump,” he says. But for now, it is better not to rely too much on this optimism, but to wait for the start of the agreements with Syria. It is true that al-Sharaa is a key partner in shaping the new Regional map of influence, but his diplomatic decisions are dependent on forces larger and more powerful than himself. In addition to the border agreements between Syria and Israel, al-Sharaa could play a decisive role in ending the border conflict between Israel and Lebanon. Under the ceasefire agreement, the two countries agreed to begin the process of marking the land border, which will require the resolution of 13 points of dispute, including the status of the Shebaa Farms.
These “farms” are recognized by Israel and the UN as part of Syrian territory, while Lebanon claims they belong to it and demands that Israel withdraw from them. For years, the Lebanese government has asked Bashar al-Assad for an official document confirming Lebanese sovereignty over these farms, but Syria has flatly refused. The issue is expected to resurface in talks between Lebanon and Syria, and the decision on the fate of the farms will largely be in the hands of al-Sharaa.