A conflict that began with tanks and then artillery is now focusing on a new generation of drones, targeting military, industrial, economic and civilian targets.
Finally, in the middle of the night, the threat from the sky has passed. The rain has stopped and the Ukrainian drones are ready for their next mission. Ground crews, shrouded in darkness and faint green and red lights, prepare a series of Ukrainian Fire Point FP-2 drones. The aircraft, with a wingspan of about 6 feet and more than 100 pounds of explosives, are lined up for an attack mission toward Russian-occupied Luhansk, more than 300 miles away.
The main piston engine makes a noise reminiscent of a scooter, but everything changes when the launch booster is activated. The roar of the jet engine spreads with force and is almost deafening. A burst of fire propels the drone skyward, signaling the Ukrainian 413th Drone Unit to pack up and leave. The scene is now repeated almost every night by dozens of Ukrainian teams, reflecting the way the war has changed. The conflict that began with tanks and then became dominated by artillery is now moving beyond the first generation of drones. Death and destruction are being caused by new weapons, in ever-increasing numbers, hundreds of kilometers from the front lines. The targets are military, industrial and economic, but the attacks also affect the civilian population.
While Ukraine has developed its drone and missile capabilities to a level comparable to Russia’s, after periods when Ukrainian cities were hit by hundreds of drones a day, Moscow has also transformed its arsenal. Russia is using a new generation of jet-powered drones, further blurring the balance of power in this aspect of the war.
The Raid unit is a specialized drone formation that was created two years ago. According to one of its commanders, known by the nickname “Skipper,” the unit has been using Ukrainian-designed and manufactured FP-2 attack drones since last fall. “When we started, there was only one team that could conduct two missions a week. Today we can do ten times that, or even more,” he says. Speaking from a car as rain pelted the windows, Skipper says there is another side to long-distance warfare. Although the attacks are carried out from a distance and the soldiers cannot directly see the enemy, the danger remains great. “They can do the same thing,” he says, referring to the fact that the Raid unit teams are also targets. “You may not see the enemy with your own eyes, but it is still a very dangerous game,” he adds.
The FP-2 was first publicly announced by Ukraine only in September last year. The drone is designed to strike protected targets and disrupt Russian logistics at an intermediate distance from the front.
“MORE DRONES…RUSSIAN DRONES”
The success of the “Raid” unit and other formations that carry out drone strikes deep into the territory has helped to significantly slow the Russian advance. Russia took about 90 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory in August, compared with 505 square kilometers a year earlier. Western officials also estimate that Russia is losing about 6 more soldiers a month than it is recruiting.
In the broader Ukrainian military structure, specialized units of the Unmanned Systems Forces, including the “Raid” regiment, work with frontline army units and special forces. A major attack, such as the one on the Moscow refinery on September 20, about 480 kilometers from the Ukrainian border, involves several units operating simultaneously. In a long-range operation, up to 300 drones can be launched, with the goal of reaching 1 drones in one night. Soldiers describe this method of attack as an “orchestra,” with the cheaper drones helping to identify air corridors to the final target.
The FP-1, the largest and longest-range drone, has been used repeatedly to strike warehouses, refineries and other military and economic targets up to 2,900 kilometers inside Russian territory. According to data from the International Energy Agency, Russian crude oil production has fallen by 7.7 percent in a year, while interest rates in Russia have remained at 14 percent.
“The parties are becoming increasingly capable of turning deep-seated attacks into economic consequences,” says Sidharth Kaushal of the Royal United Services Institute. On the eastern front in Donetsk, a unit specializing in shorter-range drones, the Special Operations Center, provides a close-up look at how missions are planned. Znakhar, 33, had worked as a programmer before the full-scale Russian invasion. During the day, he reviews new targets identified by Western satellites or Ukrainian reconnaissance drones. The joint system registers targets such as Russian artillery and electronic jamming systems, while he analyzes the footage to gather as much information as possible.
At night, the team uses Sych drones, which cost about $25 and resemble large model airplanes. Weather permitting, they can carry out two to six bombing missions dozens of kilometers behind the front line. Znakhar, whose nickname means “healer,” determines the initial flight route within seconds with a few clicks on a map. He then changes the route to avoid populated areas, high ground, and known locations where surveillance drones are launched.
What has changed recently? “More drones,” he replies. “Russian drones.” Team member Ananas, 30, goes out at night to carry out missions, but with more security measures than when the unit first started two years ago. Now preparations are made underground, whereas before the teams could also work outdoors. He studied architecture and later worked as a 3D artist at a video game studio. “I play a lot of video games, so I’m good with a controller. It’s a big advantage, because now I’m a pilot,” he says. So the line between reality and the world of games is getting narrower.
On the other hand, Moscow has long had ballistic missiles and cruise missiles at its disposal, enabling it to strike any part of Ukraine as early as February 2022. In the first year of the war, Russia imported Shahed drones with triangular wings from Iran to increase the number of long-range strikes. It later developed inexpensive drones for battlefield use, as well as its own version of the Shahed.
But since May, the Russian arsenal has undergone a series of significant changes. Russia is now using faster drones with jet engines, increasing its ability to strike targets in Ukraine. “Russia never stops,” said Serhii Beskrestnov, a defense technology adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, during an interview in Kiev that was interrupted by an air raid and distant explosions. The Iranian Shahed drone, known in Russia as the Geran-2, has been redesigned and equipped with a jet engine. The Geran-4, with more aerodynamic wings, can fly at speeds of 300 to 550 kilometers per hour. The cylindrical Geran-5 is even faster, reaching about 600 kilometers per hour. Its speed is similar to that of a new light cruise missile, known as the Banderol.
According to forecasts cited in this report, Russia aims to produce 36 Shahed jet-powered drones by 2027, about 10 Banderols and a similar number of Dan-T cruise missiles. These weapons could be used during the winter to hit Ukraine’s electricity, heating and water supply systems, which are already under great strain.
UKRAINIAN DEFENSE CHALLENGED
The Telefly engines of these new weapons are manufactured in China. The drones are faster than Ukrainian interceptor systems, which were originally designed to shoot down older piston-engined Shahed variants. The Shahed’s interception rate, which was once over 90 percent, has fallen to around 60 percent against the new Russian models. This has had direct consequences for Ukraine’s air defenses.
A combination of jet-powered and conventional drones carried out a rare morning attack in central Kiev last week. A market near the central train station and business district was hit, killing two people and injuring 41 others. In late August, a Geran-4 drone struck an ammunition depot in Myla, near Kiev, killing 38 people and destroying nearby homes. Another drone hit the headquarters of the Security Service of Ukraine, SBU, in central Kiev. However, there are reports that it may have been controlled by a Russian agent on the ground in the final stages of its flight. After repeated attacks on warehouses in August, the supply of food to Kiev’s supermarkets has become patchy. In early September, other attacks also hit gas stations in the capital.
Ukrainian military propaganda is very active in publicizing successful missions on social media, but the full picture of the impact of drone strikes on Russia is harder to determine. “We had a really good period in the spring, and almost every night we saw one, two, three or four systems destroyed,” says Skipper. “Since June and July, they’ve just been disappearing.”
Other Ukrainian military sources say Russia has significantly improved its electronic jamming capabilities. As a result, cheap attack drones are no longer as accurate as before. In this long-distance war, the number of civilian casualties is increasing. New United Nations data shows that 2,222 people were killed in Ukraine in the first eight months of 2026, more than in all of 2025. In August alone, 368 people were killed in Ukraine, while 113 deaths were reported in Russia. Warehouses owned by Ukrainian supermarkets, the Nova Poshta postal service and online shopping companies were hit at least 32 times. Meanwhile, warehouses owned by Russian companies Wildberries and Ozon were bombed 17 times by Ukraine.
However, the consequences could be even more severe for Ukraine. “Russia has advantages that Ukraine does not have,” says Kaushal. According to him, Russia has a more diverse range of long-range weapons, a more extensive air defense network, and more economic and social reserves to withstand the pressure, since its population has not faced such a long and intense war.
Ukraine, meanwhile, is facing huge economic pressure. Its war budget has already been exceeded and the country needs to raise another £40 billion next year. Although the war is escalating and the technology used in it is changing rapidly, neither side seems close to defeat or a decisive crisis. Another test could come if Russia tries to mobilize up to 300 men after parliamentary elections. At the same time, Ukraine is again struggling to secure the necessary funding and, above all, to cope with the approaching winter. In their military shelter, Ananas and Znakhar wonder if this war will ever end.
“Sometimes I get this feeling,” Ananas admits. But Znakhar interrupts: “We just have to hold out one more day than they do.” (The Guardian)