Europe is gradually entering a new area of uncertainty. The war in Ukraine, Russian hybrid attacks, Chinese penetration of critical infrastructure, low-intensity terrorism, cyberattacks are consolidating and creating different data and security requirements. In this context, the European Commission decides that the existing tools are no longer sufficient. It wants its own intelligence analysis mechanism
A “European CIA”, that’s what they’re already calling it in Brussels and in the European media, even if it’s much smaller in scale, at least on paper. The movement has a name and an address. Ursula von der Leyen, Secretary-General of the Commission. A new intelligence unit that will be placed at the heart of the EU’s executive branch and will be supported by the national services of the member states. The question is simple but explosive: will Europe really become a player that knows its job, or will it open up another front of conflict between the states and Brussels?
To understand the discussion about a “European CIA”, we need to look at what already exists. Cooperation between European intelligence services is not starting today. The so-called Berne Club has been operating since 1971, an informal forum in which the heads of the intelligence services of the EU states, along with Norway and Switzerland, participate. The topic is the exchange of sensitive information, mainly on terrorism and violent subversion. Without an institutional basis, without an official headquarters, without public control. After September 11, the mechanism was strengthened. The Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG) was created, a more specialized network to deal with the jihadist threat, linked to EU structures, but not formally integrated into them. At the same time, an official center was built in Brussels, the EU Intelligence and Situation Center, known as IntCen. This is the EU’s political and state analysis unit, administratively integrated into the European External Action Service (EEAS).
It has around 70-100 staff, analyses material coming from the member states and produces reports for the council, the European Council and the High Representative. In addition, since 2007 the so-called Single Intelligence Analysis Capability (SIAC) has been operating – a combination of IntCen with the military intelligence arm of the EU Military Staff (EUMS Intelligence). There, the holistic processing of political and military data takes place. Typically, then, Europe now has three axes of action:
– informal network (Club de Berne, CTG),
– institutional analytical center (IntCen),
– unified political-military analysis (SIAC).
What is missing? In Von der Leyen’s eyes, something essential is missing, a mechanism that is politically dependent on the Commission and not the EEAS, where the member states and the High Representative have the first say.
WHAT DOES THE COMMISSION PROPOSE?
The proposal, revealed by the Financial Times and confirmed by EU officials, envisages the creation of a new intelligence unit within the Commission’s Secretariat-General. The unit would:
– be staffed with officials seconded from national intelligence services,
– collects and synthesizes information already circulating in the European network,
– produces risk analyses and assessments for the President, the College of Commissioners and critical directorates,
– acts as a hub within the broader “European Democracy Shield” initiative and the newly established Democracy Resilience Center, which aims to address hybrid threats and foreign interference.
We are not talking about a service with thousands of agents, surveillance and secret operational networks. The model is more “brains” than “hands”. A small unit – initially a few dozen managers – that will sit on a mountain of data and try to turn it into political power. Why now? The official reason is the escalation of hybrid threats: Russian disinformation campaigns, Chinese influence operations, attacks on infrastructure, cyberattacks. The unofficial reason is more political: Von der Leyen wants a tool that will give the Commission real power in the security field, an area traditionally dominated by member states and the High Representative.
HOW WILL IT WORK?
In practice, the new unit will be based on three foundations:
– IntCen and SIAC: They will continue to operate within the EEAS, producing strategic analysis on foreign policy and security.
– National services: They will remain the only ones with operational responsibilities on the ground.
– The new Commission Core: Will extract information from the two above and translate it into policy priorities, legislation and interventions.
Theoretically, the unit will focus on:
– hybrid threats,
– foreign interference in elections and institutions,
– infrastructure crises,
– coordination of responses between the Commission, the Council and the Member States.
Supporters of the idea point out that the Commission already has a huge amount of data from regulators, financial services, energy markets, digital platforms. Using this data with a real “information logic” could strengthen early warning capacity and boost security structures across the Union.
WHEN THE SECRET SERVICES DON’T WANT OTHER PLAYERS
As expected, there is no shortage of reactions. German publications note dissatisfaction in European capitals, which see the new structure as competing with SIAC and IntCen, which have already been institutionally strengthened in recent years. The main arguments of the critics:
– Dual structure: Why create a new center when IntCen already exists?
– Responsibilities: The Lisbon Treaty is clear: “National security remains the exclusive responsibility of each Member State.”
– Trust: How willing are agencies to send critical and sensitive information to a structure they do not control?
-Political control: A unit within the Commission gives great power to the EU’s executive body, which is already causing tensions in other policies (economic, fiscal, immigration).
– Behind the war lines, the conflict is also personal: Von der Leyen on one side, Kaia Kalas on the other as High Representative and head of the EEAS. Essentially, it is a fight over who will hold the key to European foreign and security policy. Some analysts see here a repetition of the old European dilemma:
– intergovernmental logic (member states),
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– supranational logic (Commission).
USA, RUSSIA AND CHINA
The discussion about a “European CIA” cannot be separated from major geopolitical changes and challenges. European services are openly concerned about the future of cooperation with the US. An article in “Le Monde” recorded as early as April that Europeans fear a period of instability in American politics, with possible fluctuations in the exchange of information depending on who occupies the White House. At the same time, Russia has entered a permanent state of hybrid warfare: disinformation operations, fake websites imitating Western media, attacks on infrastructure, interference in countries’ electoral processes.
China is investing in influence networks, think tanks, social media and strategically important companies. We are not talking just about military espionage, but about a systematic effort to shape the European public space. In this context, the idea that Europe should acquire its own autonomous analytical capacity seems less like a political luxury and more like a necessity for survival. The question is not whether it should cooperate with the US or NATO – that will continue anyway. The question is whether it can stand without being a mere “client” of third parties. A strengthened European intelligence mechanism could help to:
– a better view of Turkish activity,
– monitoring of flows and networks in the Balkans,
– early warning of hybrid attacks on infrastructure,
– strengthening the country’s position in EU security forums.
On the other hand, there is always the fear that the big powers within the EU (France, Germany, Italy) will de facto control the flow and priorities of information, leaving the smaller countries in the role of passive recipients. This makes the Greek stance essential: not to be content with monitoring, but to claim a role in planning.
HOW BIG IS THE STEP?
At the moment, IntCen has a few dozen analysts, with a total staff of around 70-100 employees. The new core of the Commission is starting even smaller – the information speaks of “a few dozen experts” in the first phase. So we are not talking about a “CIA of 20,000 employees”, but about a political signal. For a first step that sends a message: the Commission does not want to be just a regulatory office. It wants to be a center of power. At the institutional level, the issue is delicate. The EU treaty is clear: national security belongs to the states. The Commission is trying to move in the gray area between security and political stability, saying that it is not creating an intelligence service, but an analytical center for the protection of the institutions and policies of the Union. This may reduce legal obstacles, but does not solve the political problem.
WHO WINS, WHO LOSES AND WHAT IS AT STAKE?
If the plan goes ahead, the Commission itself will be the first to win. It will be able to shape the agenda on sanctions, energy security, digital policy and the protection of democratic institutions more aggressively. Those member states that feel threatened but do not have strong national mechanisms will also win: the countries of Eastern Europe, the smaller countries on the periphery. With a European structure, they can gain an image that they would not have on their own.
And who are the losers? Services that fear losing their monopoly on information, governments that don’t want another structure in Brussels demanding access to their most sensitive data, those who see every crisis as an opportunity to expand the EU’s “strong core” into areas that were once unimaginable.
EUROPE BETWEEN NEED AND FEAR
The discussion about a “European CIA” is actually a discussion about what kind of Europe we want. A Europe that will continue to rely on the US and the NATO umbrella for security, while maintaining a strong core of security services in the member states, or a Europe that will dare to provide its own analysis and early warning mechanism, while accepting that this also means increasing risks? The reality is probably somewhere in between. The new unit will not become a “European CIA” tomorrow morning. It will be small and largely “tied hand and foot” by political balances. But any such structure tends to grow and gain weight.
If the history of the EU shows anything, it is that big changes don’t come all at once. They come in successive steps. IntCen started as a small open-source center. Now it is the de facto brains of the Union’s analysis. The same could happen with the new unit. Today a few dozen analysts, tomorrow perhaps the main center for how Europe reads the world.
And then the question will no longer be whether Europe needs its own information centre, but whether the member states have managed to shape the rules of the game. Or whether they have simply woken up to a reality where the security of the Union is decided from an office on some floor of the General Secretariat. Security, after all, in the 21st century is not judged only at borders or on battlefields. It is judged by who knows first. And by who can turn that knowledge into power. And this is where Europe is now deciding whether it wants to be a spectator or a player.