War with Iran for Netanyahu’s electoral motives!

“Much will depend on the Trump-Netanyahu dynamic,” notes Laure Foucher. To regain the initiative, Benjamin Netanyahu is counting on Donald Trump’s reluctance to back down without a clear victory and aims to use his influence in Washington to maintain American pressure in support of Israeli objectives in this conflict.

Having successfully persuaded the United States to join Israel in the fight against Iran, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu now faces a more complex equation. His sharp rise in popularity at the start of the conflict seemed to confirm the political triumph of the most stable leader in the country’s history, as Israeli and American forces claimed to have dealt a decisive blow to the Iranian regime and its military structures.

But this momentum has its limits. When US President Donald Trump proposed a ceasefire, however fragile, Netanyahu had to comply, albeit reluctantly. With elections approaching, in a still uncertain Regional context, a crucial question now arises: what room for maneuver does he have to turn the war into a political advantage?

With elections scheduled for later this year, Netanyahu’s political survival appears increasingly to depend on the outcome of the conflict. “There is growing criticism of Netanyahu, including within his own base, particularly regarding the results achieved in Iran and Lebanon,” notes Laure Foucher, a researcher at the Foundation for Strategic Research. Most Israelis oppose the current ceasefire with Iran and predict a resumption of fighting within the next year, according to a poll by the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), which highlights deep skepticism about the strength of the agreement and its ability to achieve its stated objectives.

Thus, 73% of respondents believe that Israel will have to resume war against Iran within the next 12 months, while 76% believe that negotiations with the Islamic Republic will not achieve the goals of the war: dismantling Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities, ending its nuclear program, and overthrowing the regime.

“Many Israelis thought that the nuclear issue would be resolved, or at least postponed for a few years, and that the ballistic missile threat would be reduced. However, today they find themselves once again immersed in a major war, with considerable costs and without a clear outcome,” continues Laure Foucher. Faced with falling public opinion in an election year where the polls are unfavorable to him – a poll conducted by Israeli public broadcaster Kan gives 51 seats to Netanyahu’s coalition and 59 to opposition parties, Benjamin Netanyahu is seeking to restore his damaged credibility.

On April 12, in a pre-recorded speech, the Israeli prime minister, true to his rhetoric of a besieged but safer country, presented a map of the Region where Israel, clearly including the West Bank, appears surrounded by several countries: Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, and Yemen, all highlighted in red.

That same day, he visited areas of southern Lebanon under Israeli control to meet with troops engaged in the fight against Hezbollah. “There is still a lot to do, and we are doing it,” he declared. “We have prevented the threat of an invasion from Lebanon thanks to this safe zone.” “Lebanon is much more vulnerable in the Israeli consciousness,” emphasizes Laure Foucher. In the aforementioned INSS survey, a large majority of respondents (69%) believe that Israel should continue its military operations against Hezbollah, regardless of any ceasefire. “An entire population in the north of the country, to whom Netanyahu had promised a safe return, still cannot return home.”

But a paradox emerges: at the same time, 62% of respondents believe that the current war in Lebanon will not achieve lasting security. Criticism of Netanyahu thus coexists with widespread support for the strategy he embodies, in the absence of a clear alternative.

It is in this context that the idea of ​​a “security belt” in Lebanon has resurfaced – a revival of a strategy already implemented by Israel between the 1980s and 2000s, consisting of a prolonged occupation of the south of the country to remove threats from the border. This policy is widely considered a failure in Israel, but Benjamin Netanyahu is now trying to present it as a solution to secure the north of the country. “In the absence of any real opposition to his Regional vision, if Netanyahu manages to create a security zone in southern Lebanon, while also achieving a diplomatic result and some success in Iran, this could clearly strengthen him,” believes Laure Foucher.

The security and militaristic consensus that has taken root in Israeli society since October 7 gives him a distinct comparative advantage over an opposition that is nevertheless becoming increasingly harsh, including on security issues.

Considered his main rival and at the forefront of the opposition to his judicial reforms, Naftali Bennett accuses the Prime Minister of pushing through controversial laws during the war, seeking to impose a complete exemption from military service for ultra-Orthodox Jews and keeping advisers with Qatari ties in their positions. “The problem with the opposition is that it does not offer a Regional vision that is fundamentally different from Netanyahu’s,” analyzes Laure Foucher. He is the one who continues to set the terms of the debate on Israeli foreign policy, whether on Iran, Lebanon or even the Palestinian issue.

In other words, the Prime Minister’s actions will have a greater impact on the election outcome than the campaigns waged by his opponents.

But Israel’s dependence on the United States in pursuing its Regional ambitions is becoming increasingly apparent and is beginning to weigh heavily on the public debate. Long presented as the main mediator between Washington and Tel Aviv, Netanyahu may now be testing the limits of that relationship. While he managed to convince the Trump administration to engage in war with Iran and still enjoys its political support, American public opinion is changing.

According to a Pew Research Center poll released on April 7, 60% of Americans now have an unfavorable view of Israel, up from 53% last year. The shift is also evident within Donald Trump’s “America First” base, who increasingly believe that the role given to Israel in American foreign policy is distracting from the MAGA movement’s core priorities: less involvement abroad and more focus on domestic issues.

“Much will depend on the Trump-Netanyahu dynamic,” notes Laure Foucher. To regain the initiative, Benjamin Netanyahu is counting on Donald Trump’s reluctance to back down without a clear victory and aims to use his influence in Washington to maintain American pressure in support of Israeli objectives in this conflict. (L’Orient-Le Jour)

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