Since Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the primary focus has been on reducing long-term American commitments and reallocating resources toward global priorities considered more urgent.
For nearly four years, the war in Ukraine has dominated Europe’s security architecture. At the same time, tensions in the Middle East and the increasingly intense rivalry with China have shifted the center of gravity of U.S. foreign policy away from the Western Balkans. In this new geopolitical reality, the region rarely appears in the headlines of American foreign policy. There are no longer special envoys constantly traveling between Balkan capitals, nor daily statements on the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue or democratic reform processes.
However, this does not mean that Washington has withdrawn from the region. On the contrary, messages continue to arrive, but in a much quieter form: through strategic reports, congressional testimonies, Pentagon documents, and occasional statements from the U.S. State Department. One such signal recently came through the U.S. administration’s report on policy toward the Western Balkans, in which Albania and Kosovo are described as important partners of Washington in the regional security architecture.
The document represents a noticeable shift in the tone of American diplomacy. Instead of the traditional post-war narrative, in which the Balkans were viewed as a region requiring crisis management and external intervention, the report speaks of reciprocal partnerships and shared responsibilities.
“American policy in the Western Balkans is no longer about rescue or reconstruction, but about stability and mutually beneficial partnerships,” the document states. In this logic, Albania and Kosovo are no longer presented merely as countries benefiting from NATO or U.S. security guarantees, but as actors capable of contributing to security themselves. Nevertheless, not everyone interprets this as a major American strategic return to the region.
According to Florian Bieber, Professor of Southeast European Studies at the University of Graz, the interpretation should be made cautiously.
“I do not see the United States as being interested in security partnerships in the region. It remains clear that the primary interest is economic and transactional,” Bieber told Albanian Post.
His assessment aligns with a series of developments in recent months, where the American presence in the region has become more visible through energy projects and investments rather than through new security initiatives. In just over a month, three countries in the region—Albania, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina—became involved in major energy agreements directly linked to U.S. interests. This spring alone, Albania signed a 20-year agreement with the American companies Venture Global and Aktor LNG USA for the supply of liquefied natural gas (LNG), a project worth approximately $6 billion, which the U.S. administration presented as part of its strategy to strengthen regional energy security.
The U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Kimberly Guilfoyle, described the agreement as a key step toward creating a region that is “more connected, more secure, and more prosperous,” directly linking the project to the energy agenda of the Trump administration. At the same time, Croatia signed an agreement with the United States to expand gas infrastructure and energy networks in the Balkans, while Bosnia and Herzegovina advanced a new gas pipeline project supported by investors linked to President Donald Trump’s economic circle. All three cases share a common element: reducing dependence on Russian energy and strengthening the American presence in the energy market of Southeast Europe.
According to Bieber, the support that Tirana and Pristina have given to the policies of the Trump administration has been viewed positively in Washington, but this does not necessarily translate into a new strategic partnership.
“Albania’s and Kosovo’s support for the policies of the Trump administration has been positive for the White House, but I do not think this is based on a security partnership. It is more related to affirming Trump’s policies,” he argues.
In fact, Bieber’s interpretation corresponds with a broader trend in American foreign policy. Since Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the main focus has been on reducing long-term American commitments and redirecting resources toward global priorities considered more urgent. This has also been reflected in debates over the U.S. military presence in Europe. In recent weeks alone, the American administration has signaled reductions in its military presence in several European countries, while discussions about NATO’s future role have become increasingly intense. Yet even in this climate of uncertainty, Kosovo appears to continue being treated as a special case.
In a response to Albanian Post, the Pentagon previously confirmed that there are currently no planned changes to the American presence within NATO’s mission in Kosovo, KFOR.
“We have no force posture changes to announce regarding KFOR,” the official response from the U.S. Department of Defense stated. At first glance, this may seem like routine diplomatic language. But at a time when Washington is reviewing its military presence elsewhere in Europe, the fact that Kosovo is not mentioned among the planned reductions carries particular significance.
For Bieber, the key question is not whether Albania and Kosovo can become “security providers,” but with whom they should build that role.
“It would be better for them to engage with European security structures rather than with Trump, who does not seem interested in long-term alliances but in short-term victories,” he argues.
This is perhaps the paradox of the current moment.
On the one hand, American documents continue to include the Western Balkans in Washington’s strategic map. On the other hand, the region is no longer at the center of U.S. attention as it was in the late 1990s or during the first decade after Kosovo’s independence. For this reason, every State Department report, every Pentagon statement, and every reference by the U.S. administration to the Balkans carries more weight today than its actual content. Because in a world revolving around Ukraine, Gaza, Iran, and China, the mere fact that Washington continues to speak about the Balkans is itself a political message.
In the end, perhaps the question is not whether the United States is returning to the Balkans, but in what form.
If during previous decades the American presence was primarily identified with security and diplomatic intervention, today it is increasingly expressed through energy, strategic investments, and economic partnerships. The Balkans may no longer be at the top of Washington’s agenda, but the region remains part of its strategic calculations.