For the moment, the continent is preparing for a ceasefire. Under the banner of a “coalition of the willing,” it is preparing an international military force to help Ukraine prevent the next Russian invasion, along with a financial effort to rebuild the war-torn country. But some officials suggest that Europe must also prepare for the war to drag on with difficulty.
Vladimir Putin may have a reputation among some as a ruthless autocrat, a master manipulator on the international stage. But one thing the Russian president does not have is a poker face. The late U.S. senator John McCain once joked that when he looked into Putin’s eyes, he saw three letters: “K, G, and B,” a reference to Putin’s past as a Soviet intelligence officer. Analyzing footage of the Russian leader sitting across from American envoys in the Kremlin, one can see that he cannot hide his emotions: he radiates supreme confidence. Putin believes the diplomatic tide has turned in his favor, with an improved relationship with America and gains on the battlefield.
Some analysts argue that Putin has no incentive to retreat from his demands: that Ukraine relinquish the remaining 20% of Donetsk it still controls, that all occupied territories be recognized internationally as Russian, that Ukraine’s military be reduced to impotence, and that NATO membership be permanently ruled out.
As things stand, several scenarios are possible. The first is that U.S. President Donald Trump might try to force Ukraine to accept a ceasefire on terms undesirable to its people—one that cedes territory and fails to provide sufficient security guarantees to deter future Russian aggression. If Ukraine refuses or Russia vetoes it, Trump has hinted that he may simply walk away from the war. Last week he said, “sometimes you have to let people fight.” He may also stop providing the vital U.S. intelligence Ukraine needs to detect Russian drones and target Russian energy infrastructure.
Another possibility is that the war grinds on, as Russian forces continue to make slow advances in the east. The Trump administration’s new national security strategy implies that Russia is no longer an “existential threat” to the United States and calls on Washington to “restore strategic stability” with Moscow. With American support for Ukraine now in serious doubt, what—if anything—might change Putin’s mind? And what else could Ukraine, Europe, or even China do differently?
CAN EUROPE DO MORE?
For now, the continent is preparing for a ceasefire. Under a “coalition of the willing,” Europe is preparing an international military force to help Ukraine deter future Russian attacks, along with financial support to rebuild the devastated country. But some officials warn that Europe must prepare for the war to continue. They want to help Ukraine not only to “win the war tonight” with more drones and funding, but also to provide long-term support and prepare for a possible conflict with Russia in 15 to 20 years.
Europe could also do more to defend Ukraine’s skies from drones and missiles. There is already a plan—the European Sky Shield Initiative—which could be expanded to allow European air defenses to protect western Ukraine.
Others argue that European troops could be stationed in western Ukraine to patrol borders, freeing Ukrainian soldiers to fight on the front lines. Most such proposals have been rejected for fear of provoking Russia or escalating the conflict. Keir Giles, a senior consulting fellow at Chatham House’s Russia & Eurasia program, said such fears were “nonsense,” because Western troops are already present on the ground, and the Sky Shield could be deployed in western Ukraine with little risk of clashes with Russian aircraft. According to him, European leaders would need to “enter the conflict in a way that would actually make a difference.”
“The only thing that will unquestionably and undeniably stop Russian aggression is the presence of Western forces strong enough in the place Russia wants to attack—and the demonstrated will and determination that they will be used to defend it,” Giles said.
Such a strategy would face enormous political hurdles, as many voters in Western Europe would be unwilling to risk confrontation with Russia.
Few analysts expect Ukraine to reverse the tide and make significant territorial gains. Some Western diplomats claim that Russian generals are misleading Putin about the real situation on the ground. According to Thomas Graham in Foreign Affairs, Russia has gained only 1% of Ukrainian territory this year, at a cost of more than 200,000 dead and wounded.
Fiona Hill, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and former official in Trump’s National Security Council, says Putin’s biggest advantage is the widespread belief that Ukraine is losing. “Everyone talks about Ukraine as a loser when it currently has the most powerful army in Europe,” she said.
TRADE, SANCTIONS, AND RUSSIA’S ECONOMY
Russia’s economy is certainly under strain: inflation at 8%, interest rates at 16%, slowing growth, rising budget deficits, falling real incomes, and higher consumer taxes. A recent report says Russia’s war economy is running out of steam. “The Russian economy is significantly less able to finance the war than it was in early 2022,” the authors argue. Yet none of this appears to have significantly changed the Kremlin’s thinking, partly because businesses have found ways to circumvent restrictions—for example, shipping oil on unregistered “ghost ships.”
Tom Keatinge, director of the Centre for Finance and Security, said Western messaging on sanctions was inconsistent and full of loopholes. Russia, he said, would find ways around the latest U.S. sanctions on oil giants Lukoil and Rosneft by relabeling exported oil as coming from non-sanctioned companies.
If the West truly wanted to damage Russia’s war economy, Keatinge argued, it would impose a full embargo on Russian oil and enforce secondary sanctions on countries still buying it. “We need to stop being polite and impose a full embargo,” he said. “We need to take sanctions enforcement as seriously as the Kremlin takes sanctions evasion.”
Sanctions could also influence public opinion. In October, a poll by the state-run VCIOM found that 56% of Russians felt “very tired” of the conflict, up from 47% the previous year. Still, most Russians remain supportive of Putin’s strategy.
The European Union may agree to use around €200 billion in frozen Russian assets to generate a so-called “reparations loan” for Ukraine. The European Commission’s latest proposal is to raise €90 billion over two years. But EU members remain hesitant.
Belgium, which holds most of the assets, fears legal action from Russia—and the Russian central bank has already announced proceedings against Euroclear in a Moscow court. Belgium says it will not support the plan unless legal and financial risks are clearly shared. France also has concerns, given its high public debt and fears that tapping frozen assets could undermine Eurozone stability.
EU leaders will try again to reach a deal at their December 18 summit, but diplomats warn there are no guarantees.
There is also disagreement about how the funds should be used: to sustain the Ukrainian state now, or to pay for reconstruction after the war.
THE QUESTION OF MILITARY RECRUITMENT IN UKRAINE
Ukraine could also mobilize more soldiers. It still has Europe’s second-largest army (after Russia) and its most technologically advanced—but it is struggling to defend an 800-mile front line. After nearly four years of war, many soldiers are exhausted and desertion rates are rising. Recruiters face difficulties filling gaps, as some young men hide or flee the country. But Ukraine could expand its conscription laws. Currently, only men aged 25–60 are required to be available for service.
This is a deliberate strategy to account for Ukraine’s demographic challenges: a low birth rate and millions living abroad mean the country cannot afford to lose its “fathers of the future.”
Fiona Hill noted that Ukraine has learned the demographic lessons of World War I—in which European empires collapsed partly because they failed to regenerate the population that had fueled their economic growth. “Ukraine is thinking about its demographic future,” she said.
STRIKES, DIPLOMACY, AND TRUMP
If Ukraine could import and produce more long-range missiles, it could strike deeper into Russia. This year, Ukraine has increased its airstrikes on targets in occupied territories and inside Russia. Earlier this month, Ukrainian commanders told Radio Liberty they had struck more than 50 fuel and military-industrial sites in Russia during the autumn.
Alexander Gabuev of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center says some Russians experienced fuel shortages earlier this year. But would deeper strikes change anything, when both the Kremlin and the Russian public seem indifferent?
Mick Ryan, a retired Australian major general, says deep strikes are important but not decisive: “They are a vital military effort, but insufficient to force Putin to the negotiating table or to win the war.”
Still, diplomacy remains possible. Some analysts argue that if Putin is offered a believable exit from the war, he might take it.
The idea is this: a deal that allows both sides to claim victory—perhaps a ceasefire along the line of contact, demilitarized zones, and no formal territorial recognition. Compromises everywhere.
But such a deal would require strong U.S. engagement, negotiation teams, and diplomatic pressure.
“The United States… must use the extraordinary psychological influence it holds over Russia,” argues Thomas Graham. “One cannot overstate the role that the United States—and personally Trump—plays in validating Russia as a great power and Putin as a global leader.”
THE ROLE OF CHINA
The wildcard is China. President Xi Jinping is one of the few world leaders Putin listens to. When Xi warned early in the war against nuclear threats, the Kremlin quickly toned down its rhetoric. Russia’s war machine also relies heavily on Chinese dual-use goods—electronics and machinery with both civilian and military applications.
If Beijing decided that continuing the war no longer aligned with its interests, it could exert significant influence over the Kremlin.
So far, Washington has shown little interest in pushing China to pressure Moscow. The question is whether Xi would be willing to use his leverage.
For now, China seems content for the U.S. to be distracted, for transatlantic allies to be divided, and for much of the world to view China as a source of stability. But if Russia’s invasion escalates, if global markets are shaken, or if the U.S. imposes secondary sanctions on China for consuming cheap Russian energy, Beijing’s calculations could change.
For the moment, though, Putin believes time is on his side. The longer the war drags on, analysts say, the more Ukrainian morale declines, the more divided its allies become, and the more territory Russia gains in Donetsk.
“We will either liberate these territories by force of arms, or Ukrainian troops will withdraw from them,” Putin said last week.
“Nothing will change his stance,” Fiona Hill said. “Unless he exits the stage entirely. Putin is betting he can keep going as long as events break his way.” (BBC)