After more than four years of war, Russia has paid a tremendous price, and yet Vladimir Putin is not backing down. Perhaps it is time to ask: What is Putin’s goal? And what does he call “victory”?
When we talk about war, we instinctively look for a winner and a loser. We look at the map. We count the territories conquered and recaptured. We look at the military losses, the weapons, the economy, the sanctions. And then we try to figure out who is winning. But the war in Ukraine raises a much more difficult question: What if Vladimir Putin is not measuring success by the same yardstick that we use? What if his goal has long been not a quick and spectacular victory, but something much slower: to change the conditions on which peace will be built?
This is not to say that everything that has happened was part of a perfect Russian plan. The war has produced setbacks, costs, and consequences that Moscow likely did not foresee in February 2022. But more than four years later, the way Russia continues the war forces us to ask another question. What is Putin trying to achieve now?
A COLOSSAL PRICE, BUT EVERYONE CONTINUES THE FIGHT
Russia has paid and continues to pay dearly. The war has consumed men, equipment and financial resources. The Russian economy continues to operate under a broad regime of Western sanctions, and only in recent days has Britain increased measures against networks that help Moscow evade them. The US, on the other hand, has made it clear to Moscow that economic relief remains linked to the end of the war.
Russia’s energy sector is also feeling the pressure. The latest forecasts obtained by Reuters show that Russian oil production in 2026 could fall to its lowest level since 2009, amid the fallout from the war, trade restrictions and Ukrainian attacks on energy infrastructure. Yet Moscow shows no sign of stopping. On the contrary, the fighting continues and Russian forces are trying to advance further in the Donbas. But if the cost is so great, what makes the Kremlin think it’s worth continuing?
WE MAYBE WE ARE LOOKING AT THE WRONG SCOREBOARD
If we look at the war only in terms of square kilometers, the answer remains unclear. But there is another way to read it. Putin may consider success not only the territory that Russia controls, but also the political and strategic conditions that the war produces over time. In this perspective, other questions emerge: How long can the West support Ukraine? How costly is the war becoming for the Ukrainian economy and society? How much territory can Russia hold on to? And above all: What will Ukraine look like when the time comes for negotiations?
This is a fundamental change of perspective. Because then the objective is not necessarily the occupation of all of Ukraine. The objective may be to create a reality such that the final agreement is as close as possible to Moscow’s interests.
UKRAINE IS BOTH THE OBJECTIVE AND THE LEVER
For Russia, Ukraine is not just a territory where war is being waged. It is also the point through which Moscow seeks to influence the European security architecture. The Kremlin has repeatedly demanded that Ukraine not join NATO and has demanded recognition of Russian control over territories that Moscow claims or holds as occupied. Thus, each passing month changes not only the front line. It also changes the positions from which the parties will one day negotiate. If Russia manages to hold territory, while Ukraine remains outside NATO and the war continues to consume Ukrainian and Western resources, the Kremlin may see time not only as a cost.
It could also be seen as leverage. However, it would be a mistake to interpret every Russian failure since 2022 as part of a brilliant long-term strategy. Russia first tried to take Kiev and failed. Ukraine regained significant territory. NATO, rather than being immediately weakened, expanded to include Finland and Sweden. And the war has brought about exactly what Moscow claimed it wanted to avoid: a greater NATO presence near Russia’s borders.
Therefore, the thesis that “Putin planned it this way from the beginning” does not hold. But there is another, much more realistic possibility: the strategy may have changed when the quick victory failed. From quickly taking Ukraine, towards consuming it. From an absolute military victory, towards creating a more favorable negotiating position.
CONSUMPTION WAR
This is precisely what makes the conflict so dangerous. Because war is not only measured by the territories gained by each side, but also by who gets tired first. Ukraine is facing extraordinary financial and military pressure. The Ukrainian government currently estimates a gap of about $27 billion in its defense budget, while international funding remains vital.
Meanwhile, Russia is intensifying its airstrikes. In July alone, the UN recorded 437 civilians killed and 2,610 injured in Ukraine, the highest monthly civilian casualty toll since May 2022. In late August, Russian strikes also focused on Ukrainian economic and logistical infrastructure, while recent attacks have also continued on Kiev and the surrounding Region.
But Ukraine is also trying to make the war more costly for Russia, by striking energy, logistics, and economic targets deep inside Russian territory. So we have two sides increasingly trying to undermine not just the adversary’s military but its ability to continue the war. So what could Putin call “victory”? Not necessarily the Russian flag over Kiev. A much more realistic outcome for Moscow might be a Ukraine that remains outside NATO; some Ukrainian territory that remains under Russian control; limitations or guarantees on the future configuration of Ukrainian security; and an agreement that forces the West to accept, at least de facto, some of the territorial reality created by the war.
In that scenario, Russia would not have “won” the war in the classical sense. But Putin could claim to have achieved the strategic objective. And that is a big difference. The war can also be won at the negotiating table. Perhaps this is the most interesting way to look at what is happening. Wars do not always end when one army destroys the other. They often end when the balance of power on the ground creates the conditions for a political agreement.
In this sense, every city taken, every weapons system lost, every billion spent, and every month that passes could become part of the next negotiation. So what peace is Putin trying to create through war? Because the ultimate objective may not be the invasion of Ukraine. It could be a Ukraine so weakened and a West so exhausted that terms that seemed unacceptable in 2022 may one day begin to be discussed as a compromise. And therein lies perhaps the biggest battle.