Who is really in command in Iran?

The extremist faction, though not dominant, is opposed to any concessions, convinced that if Iran continues to fight, it will defeat Israel and the United States. Its supporters have filled the streets, vowing to sacrifice themselves for the Islamic Republic. When Abbas Araghchi announced on social media the reopening of the strait, they accused the negotiating team of betrayal.

When Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ruled Iran as supreme leader, he wielded absolute power over all decisions related to war, peace and negotiations with the United States. His son and successor does not have the same role. Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei is an elusive figure: since his appointment in March, he has not appeared in public or spoken. In his place, key decisions on security, war and diplomacy are made by a group made up of commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and other figures close to them.

“Mojtaba runs the country as if he were the director of an administrative board,” says Abdolreza Davari, a politician who was an advisor to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during his presidency and knows Khamenei.

“He relies heavily on the suggestions and guidance of the members of this board; all decisions are made collectively,” Davari added in a telephone interview from Tehran. “The members of the board are the generals.” This description of the new power structure in Iran is based on interviews with six senior Iranian officials, two former officials, two people connected to the Revolutionary Guard, a senior cleric familiar with the inner workings of the system, and three people close to Khamenei. Nine others with ties to the Guard and the government contributed to describe the command structure. All spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the topics.

IRAN AND SECURITY FEARS

Mojtaba Khamenei, chosen by a council of senior clerics as the new supreme leader, has been in hiding since February 28, when Israeli and American forces bombed the compound where his father and his family lived. In addition to his father, his wife and son were also killed in the attack.

Today, it is extremely difficult to contact him; access is limited to a very narrow circle. He is surrounded mainly by a team of doctors and nurses who are tending to his wounds. Neither the leaders of the Revolutionary Guard nor senior government officials visit him, for fear that Israel might track their movements and kill him. President Masoud Pezeshkian, who is also a cardiac surgeon, and the health minister are involved in his treatment. Although seriously wounded, according to four senior Iranian officials, Khamenei is mentally clear and active. He has had three operations on his leg and is awaiting a prosthesis. He has also had surgery on his hand, from which he is gradually recovering. His face and lips are badly burned, making it difficult for him to speak, and he will need plastic surgery in the future.

He has not recorded any video or audio messages, because he does not want to appear weak in his first public speech. He has given several written statements, published online and read on state television. Messages to him are handwritten, sealed in envelopes, and sent through a chain of trusted couriers, who travel by car and motorbike along main and secondary roads to his secret location. His replies are returned in the same manner.

Because of security concerns, injuries and difficulty contacting him, Khamenei has delegated decision-making to the generals, at least for now. Both reformist and hardline factions continue to participate in political discussions. But analysts say Khamenei’s close ties to the military, forged during the Iran-Iraq war, have made them the dominant force.

US President Donald Trump has declared that the war and the assassination of several key Iranian security figures and leaders have brought about “regime change” and that the new leaders are “more reasonable”. In reality, the Islamic Republic has not fallen. Today, power is in the hands of a fortified and unyielding military structure, while the influence of the clerics is declining. “Mojtaba is not yet in full control,” explains Sanam Vakil, head of the Middle East and North Africa at Chatham House. “Maybe there is some respect for him. He signs off or is formally part of the decision-making structure. But at this point he is faced with decisions that have already been made.”

In a televised speech on April 18, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a former Revolutionary Guard general and Pakistan’s chief negotiator with the US, said that the US proposal for the nuclear deal and peace plan, as well as the Iranian response, had been presented to Khamenei and that his opinion had been taken into account in decision-making.

THERE IS NO OPPOSITION IN IRAN

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, created to protect the 1979 Islamic revolution, has amassed power by securing senior political roles, involvement in key sectors of industry, control over intelligence operations and by linking up with armed groups in the Middle East that share Iran’s hostility to Israel and the United States.

But with Ali Khamenei at the helm, the Guard still had to comply with his will as both religious leader and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He strengthened them, and over time they became an instrument and pillar of his power. Khamenei’s assassination on the first day of the war created a vacuum and an opportunity. In the battle for succession, the Guard aligned itself with Mojtaba Khamenei, playing a crucial role in his appointment as Iran’s third supreme leader. The Guard has many tools to wield power. The commander-in-chief is General Ahmad Vahidi. General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadri, recently appointed head of the Supreme National Security Council, is a former Guard commander known for his tough stances. General Yahya Rahim Safavi has been the chief military advisor to both Ali Khamenei and his son.

“Mojtaba is not supreme; he may be a leader on paper, but not supreme like his father,” says Ali Vaez, who covers Iran at the International Crisis Group and has a wide network of contacts in the country. “Mojtaba is dependent on the Revolutionary Guards because his position and the survival of the system depend on them.”

The officials interviewed say the generals see the war with the US and Israel as a threat to the regime’s survival and, after five weeks of fierce fighting, believe they have it under control. They have been steering strategy and resource allocation at every turn. They have shaken up the global economy by closing the Strait of Hormuz and have used every victory as leverage to defeat political rivals at home. According to several well-informed officials, the president and his government have been sidelined and have been asked to deal only with domestic issues, such as securing food and fuel and keeping the country running normally. Abbas Araghchi, they add, has been sidelined in the negotiations he had with the United States before the war. His place has been taken by Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the speaker of parliament.

The new supreme leader has adapted to the situation, with little opposition to the generals’ decisions, according to sources. It was the Guards who engineered the Iranian attacks on Israel and the Gulf states, as well as the closure of the strait to maritime traffic. It was they who accepted the temporary ceasefire and approved informal diplomacy and direct negotiations with Washington. They chose Ghalibaf from among their ranks to lead talks with US Vice President JD Vance in Islamabad. For the first time, several Guards generals were part of the Iranian delegation in negotiations with the United States.

THE MEN OF THE BATTALION

According to officials and three other people who know Mojtaba Khamenei, his reserved approach to the group is partly due to his new leadership role: he lacks the political clout and religious prestige that made his father such a distinguished figure. But it is also due to his deep ties to the military.

When he was 17, Mojtaba Khamenei volunteered to fight in the Iran-Iraq War. He was assigned to a Revolutionary Guard brigade called the “Habib” battalion. The experience left its mark, creating lifelong bonds. Over time, many of the men in that battalion went on to hold important roles in the military and intelligence services. Khamenei completed his studies in theology, attaining the rank of ayatollah (a scholar and jurist of the Shiite faith). He worked in his father’s compound, coordinating military and intelligence operations, a role that strengthened his ties to generals and intelligence chiefs. Among his closest friends from the “Habib” battalion are the Guard’s former intelligence chief, cleric Hossein Taeb, and General Mohsen Rezaei, his commander in the 1980s. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf is also an old friend.

According to sources, for years Khamenei, Taeb and Ghalibaf met once a week for long working lunches in the ayatollah’s offices, becoming known as the “power triangle.” The trio was accused by a more moderate cleric, Mehdi Karroubi, of interfering in the 2009 presidential election, in which he was a candidate, by manipulating the results in favor of the incumbent, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Karroubi lost, and the result of the vote sparked months of unrest, protests and violence.

A MESSAGE TO CITIZENS

The extremist faction, although not dominant, is against any concessions, convinced that if Iran continues to fight, it will defeat Israel and the United States. Its supporters have filled the streets, vowing to sacrifice themselves for the Islamic Republic. When Abbas Araghchi announced on social media the reopening of the strait, they accused the negotiating team of betrayal.

The most radical supporters are Saeed Jalili, an ultraconservative presidential candidate who has been excluded from the decision-making process but who continues to have influence, including on state television, which is run by his brother. Some have called for Mojtaba Khamenei to deliver a message to reassure the public that he is in favor of negotiations with Washington. At a rally in Tehran, the crowd chanted: “Commander, give us the order and we will follow it.” On the evening of April 18, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf appeared on television to assure Khamenei that he was involved in the decision-making. He used a defiant but pragmatic tone, saying that Iran had achieved some military successes but that now was the time to use these achievements in diplomatic negotiations.

“Sometimes I see our people saying we have destroyed them,” Ghalibaf said. “No, we have not destroyed them; you have to understand that. Our military successes do not mean that we are more powerful than the United States,” said Farnaz Fassihi. (New York Times)

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