First, they need to spend more on defense, but how is more important than how much. Increasing the share of GDP dedicated to defense is necessary, but not sufficient. Europe spends a lot on military equipment, but the whole is less than the sum of its parts.
By Richard HAAS
The second administration of US President Donald Trump has been clear from the start that it would reshape American foreign policy in fundamental ways. Its National Security Strategy, released last November, declared that “the days when the United States supported the entire world order like Atlas are over” — a shift that is especially significant for many of America’s allies and partners, who have long made dependence on the US a central tenet of their national security. The latest expression of America’s changed approach came last week, in a speech by Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth in Singapore to a gathering of defence ministers and experts: “We need partners, not protectorates,” Hegseth declared. “We seek alliances built on shared responsibility, not dependency. This is the maturity of our alliances in a new era.”
This American mindset reflects, in part, the widespread view that the country’s security partners have long failed to carry their weight. There is more than a little truth to this, as many U.S. allies have the economic means to spend more on defense. What has traditionally held them back has been domestic politics and even the assumption that the United States will always protect them, no matter what. That will no longer be accepted in Washington. It also makes sense for U.S. allies and partners to shoulder responsibilities closer to home. The United States has unique and broad global responsibilities on many fronts, including Europe, the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere, which suggests a larger U.S. motive: to narrow the gap between America’s military capabilities and commitments. This gap would become immediately apparent if more than one emergency arose simultaneously, which is more than a hypothetical possibility, given the number of threats, potential and real, from state and non-state actors, facing the US and its security partners.
But the war with Iran has already exposed the gap between U.S. capabilities and commitments. America lacks not only the military systems it needs at this point, but also the manufacturing base that would enable it to produce them quickly, cheaply, and in large numbers. In this regard, the United States would be wise to learn from Ukraine, which has emerged as a modern arsenal of democracy and is leading the world in the production and use of drones. For these and other reasons—not least the volatile nature of U.S. foreign policy that no longer views allies as privileged and worthy of unwavering support—America’s traditional partners have begun to reexamine their national security strategies. They are right to do so.
First, they need to spend more on defense, but how is more important than how much. Increasing the share of GDP devoted to defense is necessary, but not sufficient. Europe spends a lot on military equipment, but the whole is less than the sum of its parts. The same can be said for the Arab states confronting Iran. In Asia, the hub-and-spoke system of alliances with Washington at the center must give way to a networked approach, in which U.S. allies do more with each other and play complementary roles in deterring and responding to aggression.
Meaningful defense cooperation requires systems tailored to local strategic circumstances, reflecting geography, available manpower, the capabilities and strategy of potential aggressors, and the assistance that can reasonably be expected from abroad. It also requires governments to be willing to integrate defense forces, rather than duplicating them from one country to another. Greater self-reliance can and should be an element of the strategic calculus, but self-sufficiency is rarely, if ever, a realistic option. Building new and deeper partnerships is. Partnerships can include the production of equipment and ammunition, the sharing of intelligence, and planning and training for joint military deployments and warfare. The most obvious partners are found in their respective regions: Japan and South Korea come to mind, as do European countries concerned about Russia and Middle Eastern countries concerned about Iran.
But partnerships don’t have to be just local. Saudi Arabia is forging new ties with Ukraine to take advantage of Ukraine’s extensive experience in manufacturing and deploying drones. South Korea is investing in missile production in Poland. It also makes sense for countries to reconsider, not reject, their security relationships with the United States. There is no reason to separate—and every reason to resist it. But for the relationship with the United States to work today, it requires rewriting the division of labor, reviewing roles, and restructuring command arrangements to give partners more of a voice.
There may also be a diplomatic dimension to all of this, to try to reduce tensions with potential or actual regional adversaries: China or North Korea in the Indo-Pacific, Russia in Europe, or Iran in the Middle East. But these potential or actual enemies must be approached only from a position of military strength, which, as noted above, requires new and deeper partnerships. Trying to accommodate any of them alone, or in the absence of a favorable military balance, and without effective deterrence, would be foolish, dangerous, or both. In a world where the United States cannot be counted on as it once was, the goal is not stability at all costs, but stability on terms that are consistent with national and Western interests. This is achievable, but only if America’s friends recognize the new reality and act individually and collectively to meet the challenge.