It is up to Albanians themselves to find a way out of the current crisis. But this task will be difficult as long as the crisis remains inseparable from Rama’s own leadership. Having concentrated unprecedented power in his own hands and presided over a system increasingly associated with corruption, clientelism and state capture, he now bears responsibility for a political crisis that has turned into a nationwide revolt.
By Elez BIBERAJ
Albania is facing its worst political crisis in Edi Rama’s thirteen years in power. Protesters, demanding the prime minister’s resignation, have attacked government buildings, clashed with police, and damaged public and private property. The unrest has spread from Tirana to the country’s major urban centers, highlighting a level of public anger and frustration that the government appears to have grossly underestimated. The unrest is not simply a reaction to recent events. It reflects a deeper crisis of governance, representation, and public trust that has been building over many years.
The outbreak of violence seems to have caught Rama completely by surprise. For months, the peaceful protests of the Flamingo movement were ignored, ridiculed, and dismissed. Convinced that they would eventually die down, Rama failed to grasp the depth of public discontent they reflected. The violent unrest that followed revealed how badly he had misread the mood of Albanian society.
However, the warning signs had been accumulating for years. Concentration of power, corruption, perceptions of state capture, and limited opportunities had steadily eroded public trust. As a narrow political and economic elite prospered and grew richer, many Albanians felt increasingly excluded from both the country’s progress and its political system.
Rama’s response to the unrest has been characteristic of an increasingly authoritarian style of governance: reliance on the police, blaming the opposition and external forces, and largely ignoring the grievances that brought people to the streets. What is most striking is that he has portrayed the unrest as a temporary flare-up, a “flame” rather than a fundamental challenge to his way of governing. This approach has not helped to contain the crisis but, on the contrary, has reinforced the image of a leader increasingly disconnected from the realities facing his country. The unrest continues to spread, public anger remains unabated, and reliance on force risks deepening, rather than containing, the crisis.
Albania urgently needs dialogue and a credible process capable of restoring legitimacy, rebuilding trust, and charting a path forward. But the conditions necessary for such a process are largely lacking. Rama’s years of personalized governance have contributed to the creation of an institutional vacuum, emptying the very channels through which dialogue would take place under such circumstances. This institutional void is particularly evident at a time of national crisis. Parliament, which should serve as the main arena of national debate and representation, has effectively withdrawn from the crisis, canceling its session as unrest spread. Meanwhile, the President has shown little willingness to assume the role of initiator of dialogue or mediator required in moments of national emergency. Genuine debate within the ruling Socialist Party has become extremely rare, communication between the government and the opposition has all but ceased, while many Albanians, especially young people, feel disconnected from a political system that no longer reflects their aspirations. Civil society, independent intellectual voices, and other institutions that could help bridge political divides have remained largely on the periphery of a national debate that urgently needs their contribution.
However, the dangers posed by the crisis leave little room for delay, indecision, or complacency. Political, intellectual, and civic forces must find a way out. Any effort to resolve the crisis must go beyond the traditional political establishment, which has contributed to the current impasse, and include student activists, civil society organizations, independent voices, and representatives of younger generations. A revolt fueled largely by disillusionment with the country’s ruling elites cannot be resolved by these same actors alone. The challenge is to build a process credible enough to regain the trust of citizens who no longer believe that the existing political system represents them properly.
The international community also has an important role to play. The United States and the European Union have invested heavily in Albania’s democratic development and Euro-Atlantic integration. However, Washington seems less inclined than in previous periods to get involved in democratic disputes abroad, while the EU has lost credibility in the eyes of many Albanians due to its perceived tolerance of democratic regression and corruption during Rama’s government. But neither side should remain a passive observer.
Albania’s stability and democratic development remain important strategic interests for both Washington and Brussels. They should use their influence to facilitate a process that fosters dialogue, compromise, and institutional reform. The goal should not be to impose solutions from outside, but to help create the conditions for a peaceful transition and democratic renewal.
Ultimately, it is up to Albanians themselves to find a way out of the current crisis. But this task will be difficult as long as the crisis remains inseparable from Rama’s own leadership. Having concentrated unprecedented power in his own hands and presided over a system increasingly associated with corruption, clientelism, and state capture, he now bears responsibility for a political crisis that has turned into a nationwide revolt. His continued refusal to acknowledge the depth of the crisis makes it increasingly difficult to see how he can lead Albania out of it. The gap separating his government from society is too wide to be bridged through police action, rhetoric, or limited concessions.
The crisis has severely undermined the political order built around Rama. There are growing signs of unease within the very establishment that has supported his rule. While few socialists have openly challenged him, many of them seem increasingly dissatisfied with both his style of governance and the way he is handling the unrest. The same may be true for influential interests in business and politics, whose support has long been conditioned on the promise of stability and continued access to power. The widespread anger sweeping the country is directed largely against Rama himself. Having become the focal point of the crisis, he seems increasingly incapable of providing the leadership needed to resolve it. Rama’s resignation has now become a prerequisite for restoring political legitimacy, reducing tensions, and paving the way for democratic renewal.
The challenge facing Albania goes far beyond the fate of a single leader. Rama’s departure, whether voluntary or forced by political reality, would be only the first, but necessary, step toward halting the country’s political deterioration and creating the conditions for addressing the deeper structural problems that have brought it to its current impasse. The most likely path forward would be the establishment of a broadly supported technical or transitional government charged with restoring stability, reopening channels of communication, and preparing the country for truly competitive elections. However, its mandate must go beyond managing a political transition. It must begin to address the corruption, clientelistic networks, and suspected links between political, business, and criminal interests that have steadily eroded public trust in state institutions.
Restoring trust requires more than a change of government. It requires a visible commitment to accountability at the highest levels of public life, including impartial investigation of corruption allegations, enforcement of the rule of law, and an end to the culture of impunity that has, too often, protected senior government officials and politically connected individuals.
Equally important is ensuring that citizens feel truly represented within the political system. Holding early elections under existing rules would risk reproducing many of the distortions that contributed to the current crisis. Albania’s electoral system favors the country’s two dominant parties, limiting the opportunities for alternative political movements to emerge and compete effectively. Therefore, a fundamental reform of the electoral framework must precede any return to the ballot box.
The objective should not be simply to hold fairer elections, but to build a more representative and open political system. Albanian democracy needs more space for new political forces, independent voices, civic initiatives and young leaders, whose aspirations remain largely unrepresented. The country cannot overcome its crisis simply by passing power from one established actor to another. It must open the political arena to new ideas, new leadership and new generations, who have become increasingly alienated from the institutions that govern them.
However, these measures, however necessary, would only address the immediate crisis. At their core, the current unrest reflects the exhaustion of a political system characterized by the concentration of power, widespread corruption, lack of accountability, and declining public trust.
The biggest challenge is rebuilding Albania’s democratic foundations: strengthening institutions, restoring mechanisms of checks and balances, fighting corruption, protecting the independence of the media, and ensuring that public functions serve citizens and not entrenched political and economic interests.
Rama now faces a clear and decisive choice. By backing down, he could spare Albania months, perhaps years, of instability, polarization, and uncertainty, while paving the way for national reconciliation and democratic renewal. Otherwise, he could stand his ground, continue on the path of confrontation, and rely on coercion and the instruments of state power to maintain his position. Such a strategy, even if it were successful in restoring order in the short term, would do little to address the underlying causes of the crisis.
On the contrary, it would risk deepening polarization, accelerating institutional degradation, and prolonging a confrontation whose cost Albania can hardly afford. In the process, it could overshadow much of his achievements since taking office in 2013, leaving his legacy defined not by the significant progress made under his leadership but by his failure to grasp the moment when the national interest demanded a different path. Albania’s current crisis has exposed the limits of a political model that no longer enjoys the trust of broad segments of society. Yet periods of profound upheaval can also create opportunities for renewal. The students and young activists who have emerged at the forefront of the current movement are heirs to the democratic aspirations that transformed Albania more than three decades ago. Their demands for accountability, representation, and opportunity reflect a determination to build a more accountable, inclusive, and democratic state.
Albania has consistently demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to confront and rise up in the face of adversity. The onus now falls on its political leaders to respond with the vision, self-restraint, and sense of national responsibility that this moment demands. If they succeed, the current turmoil may ultimately be remembered as the turning point that inspired a new generation to help fulfill Albania’s democratic aspirations.