While domestic politics partly explain Starmer’s limited agenda on China, the low ambitions are also structural. If Britain hopes to protect itself from Trumpian pressure, China offers little help. Britain’s biggest dependencies on the US are for vital assets such as nuclear deterrence, fighter jets and digital services, including cloud computing. Britain and other Western countries will not buy arms or data storage from China.
By The Economist
For the mid-sized liberal democracies, 2026 risks being a year of great loneliness. Western leaders feel threatened and mocked by an America whose protection they still need, like courtiers enduring the stings of an aging and cruel king. And to complement this sense of isolation, China, the other great power of our time, neither wants nor can become an alternative friend to the West.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney called on middle powers to stand together and cooperate in “coalitions of the willing” in a direct speech to the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 20. “We are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition,” he declared. Carney accused the most powerful countries of using economic, financial and supply chain dependencies as political weapons. “In a world of great power rivalry, countries in the middle have two choices: either compete with each other for favors, or form groupings of like-minded countries to protect themselves and manage risks,” he said. For Canada, that means reducing economic dependence on America. Carney cited strategic partnerships it has signed with China and Qatar.
However, he did not claim that China is a magic bullet for U.S. dependency. The way China pursues its interests, disregarding values, may attract middle-class transactional powers, such as those in the Persian Gulf. But for countries that aim to uphold fundamental values, respect human rights, and be, in Carney’s own words, “principled and pragmatic,” China offers only partial protection.
IN EXCHANGE OF ISSUE
During a visit to China from January 14 to 17, Carney announced that Canada would import 49,000 Chinese-made electric vehicles on preferential terms. This contradicts the US strategy of keeping Chinese electric vehicles out of North America through 100% tariffs, a policy that Canada joined in 2024 under pressure from the US, which buys more than two-thirds of Canadian exports.
In return for these concessions, China signaled that it would buy more Canadian agricultural products and fuel, among other goods. This showed a willingness to warm relations that had been cold for much of the past decade. There have been superficial comments, even from conservative analysts in the US, that Carney was siding with China against Donald Trump. But China’s reception of Carney was far from a grand strategic agreement. In Beijing, Carney thanked China for a partnership “that prepares us well for the new world order.” These warm words were not returned by Chinese President Xi Jinping, who limited himself to advising Canada to build relations on respect. Chinese state media suggested that previous bilateral tensions had revealed some important “realities” to Canada.
Another middle power, Great Britain, is expected to send its prime minister to China at the end of January. Although no British prime minister has visited China for eight years, expectations for Sir Keir Starmer’s mission are low. The talk in Whitehall is about promoting British business (with optimistic announcements about Scotch whisky and salmon) and normalizing the idea that British leaders should engage with the world’s second-largest economy.
Quietly, Starmer may seek deeper cooperation in life sciences and green technologies, although Chinese investment has been held back by American lobbying and domestic debates over the risk that Chinese technologies, such as wind turbines, could pose to national security. British officials expect harsh media headlines about “Keir bowing” to “Chinese tyrants.” In a warning, on January 20 the opposition accused the government of “surrender” after approving a long-delayed project to build a large Chinese embassy near the Tower of London. Conservative politicians and media have raised their voices, claiming that China will use this “mega-embassy” to tap into nearby communications cables, or to attack Chinese dissidents in Britain, even holding them in secret basements of the building.
Undoubtedly, security services in the democratic world regard Chinese agents and hackers as an unparalleled threat, from stealing secrets to influencing politicians and surveilling critical infrastructure. But the panic about a “super-embassy” is misguided and weak. China does not need diplomatic facilities to attempt cyberattacks; it can do so from a rented warehouse.
British cyber security experts are world-class and consider the planned complex a manageable risk. The idea that China would hold prisoners in the embassy basements would be an absurd risk. Put simply: allowing a large embassy to be built is a sign of self-confidence, not submission. In the late 30s, Britain tolerated Nazi Germany’s use of a grand embassy near The Mall, even though its ambassador, Joachim von Ribbentrop, was hated for flirting with the conciliatory elite and for giving Hitler salutes at events.
CHINA WILL NOT MAKE THIS EASY
While domestic politics partly explain Starmer’s limited agenda on China, the low ambitions are also structural. If Britain hopes to protect itself from Trumpian pressure, China offers little help. Britain’s biggest dependencies on the US are for vital assets such as nuclear deterrence, fighter jets and digital services, including cloud computing. Britain and other Western countries will not buy weapons or data storage from China.
Even in softer areas, China’s history of using supply chains as a political weapon makes it little comforting to replace dependence on America with dependence on China. If maneuvering is difficult, can liberal democracies gain geopolitical weight by threatening to turn China against America? A major obstacle is China itself. In Beijing, officials complain disdainfully that they have believed Western declarations of greater autonomy from the US, only to see them fall into line as soon as Washington raised its voice.
For Xi Jinping as much as for Donald Trump, what matters is power. And in these times of loneliness for America’s middle-class allies, China is no savior.