As diplomats and officials return to their offices in September, the EU will face potentially tough decisions and dilemmas in the fall. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty brings you five key issues that are expected to be in the spotlight in the coming months.
The European Union is on summer break for most of August, with no plenary sessions of the European Parliament, no Council meetings and no committee meetings. In short, no major issues are being discussed – let alone decided – during these weeks. But once diplomats and officials return to their offices in September, the EU will face potentially tough decisions and dilemmas in the autumn. Radio Free Europe brings you five key issues that are expected to be in the spotlight in the coming months.
WILL RUSSIA’S ASSETS BE UNLOCKED?
More than €200 billion worth of frozen Russian assets have been in the European Union since February 2022, when the bloc began imposing sanctions on Moscow following its invasion of Ukraine. Since then, fierce debate has raged over what to do with the money. On August 29-30, EU foreign ministers gather in Denmark for an informal meeting known as “Gymnich,” which often marks the opening of the bloc’s autumn session. The EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, has made clear that now is the time to decide on the fate of the assets – describing them as a powerful bargaining chip for the future, but also a source of legal dilemmas.
Many EU member states, especially those in the east that have taken a tougher approach to Moscow, are calling for the money to be seized to finance arms for Ukraine or to replenish the bloc’s arsenal. Their argument is that this could make up for a potential shortfall in US funding and that it would be fairer for Russian money to be used for this purpose, rather than European taxpayers’ money.
Others, especially the larger countries, are not ready for confiscation yet. They say the money could serve as a bargaining chip for peace or a ceasefire, as Moscow seeks to reclaim some of it. There is also talk of using it as a tool to pressure the Kremlin into cooperating with the new war tribunal. Another option is for the assets to remain frozen to finance Ukraine’s reconstruction after the war ends.
The European Central Bank has expressed fears that confiscating assets could damage the euro’s reputation as a global currency and discourage countries from investing in the eurozone. Belgium, home to the central depository Euroclear – which holds most of these sovereign assets – is also wary of unilateral action. The Belgian argument is that the frozen assets are a “golden opportunity” because the windfall profits they generate, around €1-2 billion every three months, go directly into Ukraine’s coffers.
WILL MOLDOVA AND UKRAINE BE DIVIDED ON THEIR PATH TOWARDS EU INTEGRATION?
So far, Ukraine and Moldova have been walking together on the path to membership in the European Union. Both received candidate status in 2022, and at the end of 2023, EU member states agreed to start accession talks with them. Most European diplomats expected the first half of this year to bring the opening of the first of 33 chapters, for both Chisinau and Kiev. But Hungary is blocking the start of these negotiations, claiming that Ukraine does not guarantee the rights of the Hungarian minority. Since Moldova and Ukraine have been “tied” so far in this process, the blockade also affects Chisinau. This spring there were discussions to separate these two countries in the accession process, so that at least Moldova could move forward, but no consensus was reached.
Hungary has signaled that it will not back down from this stance, especially after a non-binding referendum earlier this year in which 95 percent of participants voted against Ukraine’s EU membership. Many EU officials believe that this position will not change until after the Hungarian parliamentary elections in April 2026. Meanwhile, Moldova holds elections on September 28, with the pro-European government seeking a new mandate. Rumors are circulating in Brussels that Ukraine and its supporters have agreed to a split of the process, with Moldova moving forward alone. Such a decision could be made in early September, potentially to sway pro-EU forces in the Moldovan elections.
WHAT WILL THE EU DO FOR GEORGIA?
Brussels is expected to continue its fight this fall against Georgia’s democratic backsliding, and some of the decisions could reflect that reality. The European Commission sent a letter to the Georgian government in July, asking it to meet eight conditions set by the end of 2024 by the end of August – including repealing the controversial “foreign agents” law and the equally controversial legal package on “family values and the protection of minors.” Few in Brussels expect Tbilisi to make major moves on these issues, so the question remains: how and when will the EU respond?
So far, there have been no sanctions against officials of the ruling Georgian Dream party or judges deemed responsible for targeting the opposition and protesters, as Hungary and Slovakia have blocked them – and are expected to do so again. Work is underway in Brussels to suspend Georgia’s visa liberalization with the bloc. This measure requires only a qualified majority of EU member states (55 percent of member states representing 65 percent of the EU’s population), and that majority appears to have been secured. It would be the first time the EU has suspended visa liberalization for a candidate country, but Brussels appears to be preparing the necessary legal framework.
We could also see the suspension of some parts of the EU-Georgia association agreement, including its free trade aspects. The question remains as to timing: EU foreign ministers do not meet formally in Council format until the end of October, giving Tbilisi more time to respond. By then, Georgia will also have held local elections on 4 October – another indication of the direction the South Caucasus republic is taking.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW TRAVEL SYSTEM
After many delays, on 12 October, the European Union will finally start implementing the Entry/Exit System (EES). The system is relevant for all non-EU citizens travelling to the 24 participating Member States (all EU countries except Cyprus and Ireland, with Denmark potentially joining later), as well as four non-EU countries – Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein. The EES puts an end to manual stamping of passports and aims to replace it with a sophisticated technological system at every international airport, seaport and land border crossing, recording entries, exits, fingerprints and facial images.
The implementation will be gradual over the next six months. EU member states with major international travel hubs fear that an immediate and full launch of this system would cause a collapse. For a long time it was believed that the technological system of the EES was not technically viable, but EU officials now express confidence that everything is ready for operation. If the full implementation of the EES is completed in the first quarter of 2026, one can expect the ETIAS (European Travel Information and Authorization System) to be launched later that year, as the two systems are interconnected.
ETIAS is the EU’s equivalent of the United States’ Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) and is expected to have a major impact on travelers entering the EU without a visa. Around 1.4 billion people – including citizens of the United Kingdom, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, the United States and non-EU Western Balkan countries – will need this authorization before entering the bloc for the first time. It will be valid for three years and will cost seven euros.
WHERE ARE ELECTIONS EXPECTED?
This fall, there are not many elections expected in Europe, which is a rarity. Moldova holds a crucial vote in September, while the Netherlands is holding snap elections at the end of October, where the right-wing populist PVV party is expected to come out on top, but a coalition of the center-left and the Greens is likely to form a government. Perhaps the most interesting vote will be in the Czech Republic on October 3-4. All polls show that populist Andrej Babis will return to power. The main issue to watch is whether his ANO party will govern alone, with the support of even more radical forces on the left and right of the political spectrum, or whether any party from the current pro-European coalition will lend him support. This will determine what kind of Czechia will appear on the European stage.
Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico and Hungary’s Viktor Orban are likely to welcome a partner in Prague with whom they share views. Meanwhile, after populist Karol Nawrocki was recently sworn in as Poland’s president with the expectation of blocking legislation by the more liberal Prime Minister Donald Tusk, rumors are circulating in Warsaw that his government could fall, paving the way for the return of the conservative Law and Justice party. A like-minded Visegrad Group (V4) is emerging from all this. This bloc of four Central European countries has played an important role in shaping EU policies for years. But due to recent political differences, the V4 had remained largely a passive concept. Now, it could return as a factor to watch closely.
Of course, there are still differences – especially in terms of relations with Russia – and Warsaw remains somewhat of an outlier, as Tusk is expected to continue his course. But if Babis returns this autumn with a clear popular mandate, then we will have three Central European capitals with a skeptical attitude towards both Brussels and Kiev. This, of course, could change again when Hungary holds its long-awaited parliamentary elections in the spring of 2026, but at a key moment for Europe, the Visegrad countries could become a source of major surprises for developments to come.