The European Union (EU) has entered a period of quiet this week, as the approaching Easter holiday means there will be few important meetings in Brussels. But the quiet is not just about the holidays; most people are looking forward to perhaps the most consequential election in Europe this year, the one in Hungary on April 12.
With so many EU policies, especially those related to support for Ukraine, becoming part of the Hungarian election campaign, there is a feeling in the EU capital that things will only start to move once the elections are over, regardless of whether Viktor Orban and Fidesz manage to extend their 16-year rule, or whether their rival, Peter Magyar, and his Tisza party, win.
This optimism stems from the fact that, although Orban has made many harsh statements about Ukraine and President Volodymyr Zelensky, especially in recent months, he is expected to “mellow somewhat,” as a source told Radio Free Europe (RFE/RL), if he wins and allows some of his vetoes to be lifted.
Almost all officials REL spoke to, from both EU institutions and member states, openly admit that they would prefer a Tisza victory. But they caution that while EU-Ukraine relations are likely to improve with Magyar in power, they still expect him to be tough on Kiev and not necessarily unblock everything immediately.
So, what issues blocked by Budapest could be unblocked after the elections, regardless of who is elected prime minister?
First, Brussels expects the €90 billion loan for Ukraine – initially approved by Orbán in December but then blocked due to a lack of Russian oil supplies through the Druzhba pipeline – to be approved in April.
A team of European Commission experts is currently in Ukraine, and although they have not yet had access to the damaged pipeline, there is hope in the EU that the infrastructure will soon be repaired, oil will start flowing to Central Europe, and the loan will then be approved — although political maneuvering in both Budapest and Kiev prevents any move before April 12.
The 20th package of EU sanctions against Russia, which was initially intended to be adopted around the fourth anniversary of the full invasion of Ukraine on February 22, is also expected to be approved after the elections.
The initial proposal, which included a ban on maritime services related to Russian oil products, which would prohibit EU companies from providing services to any ship transporting these products from Russian ports, is likely to be watered down or dropped altogether due to rising energy costs following the conflict with Iran.
However, if Tisza wins, there will be a desire in Brussels to test some of the previous sanctions proposals that Hungary has so far rejected. These include sanctions on Russian nuclear energy, which other EU countries, which still cooperate with Russia’s Rosatom, are likely to block.
A potential Hungarian government may be more inclined to adopt individual sanctions against Russian Patriarch Kirill, or against the leaders of various Russian sports organizations and federations, as the current Orbán government has blocked any blacklisting of religious and sports individuals.
New efforts to impose sanctions on violent Israeli settlers in the West Bank, blocked by Budapest since 2024, as well as an attempt from 2025 to blacklist key figures in the ruling Georgian Dream party, which was also blocked by Hungary, could be revived if Tisza takes power, although other member states such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia could use their veto, at least as far as Tbilisi is concerned.
Since all sanctions decisions require unanimity, including renewals, Brussels will be interested to see whether a new Hungarian government will remove individuals from the list before each renewal period.
The current Fidesz government is known for using its approval of extensions as leverage to remove Russian oligarchs, such as Moshe Kantor, from the list. However, it seems that Slovakia has become equally adept at this game, although it remains to be seen whether Bratislava will do so without Budapest’s support.
Then there are some issues related to Ukraine that are more difficult to resolve if Fidesz remains in power. First, Orbán has made it clear that he does not see Ukraine as a future EU member and has blocked the start of Kiev’s accession negotiations since 2024.
While he may be persuaded at some point to at least give approval for the opening of some negotiation chapters in the future, this remains highly uncertain.
At the same time, Magyar is not a supporter of Ukraine’s rapid accession to the EU. He has echoed the position of EU countries that do not believe in accelerated membership for Ukraine: that the process should be based on merit and therefore take time.
He would most likely agree to opening talks with Ukraine (and Moldova, which is allied with Kiev) soon, but it is not excluded that he will drag out the issue.
The Fidesz government has made it a point not to support Ukraine militarily in any way. This has included vetoing €6.6 billion in lethal aid from the European Peace Facility (EPF) planned for Kiev, the possibility of sharing satellite imagery with Ukraine from the EU Satellite Centre (SatCen), and revising the mandates of the two EU missions in Ukraine, EUAM and EUMAM, to include them in future European security guarantees for Kiev.
There is hope in Brussels, although without concrete promises, that these three vetoes will be lifted if a new government comes to power in Hungary.
Finally, and more symbolically, there is also the expectation in Brussels that more foreign policy statements will be adopted by all 27 EU member states in the future.
Për bezdi dhe turp të diplomatëve evropianë, vitet e fundit BE-ja është detyruar të publikojë deklarata vetëm në emër të shefit të politikës së jashtme të BE-së, pasi Hungaria ka bllokuar tekste të përbashkëta që, për shembull, dënonin zgjedhjet presidenciale të manipuluara në Bjellorusi në vitin 2025, mirëpritnin fletarrestimin e GJPN-së për Vladimir Putinin dhe përkujtonin përvjetorin e vdekjes së liderit opozitar rus, Alexey Navalny. (RFE)