By Robert KAGAN
It is difficult to recall a time when the United States suffered a total defeat in a conflict, a blow so decisive that the strategic loss could neither be repaired nor ignored. The catastrophic losses at Pearl Harbor, in the Philippines, and throughout the Western Pacific during the early months of World War II were later reversed. The defeats in Vietnam and Afghanistan were costly but did not permanently damage America’s global standing because they occurred far from the main arenas of world competition. Even the initial failure in Iraq was mitigated by a shift in strategy that ultimately left Iraq relatively stable and nonthreatening to its neighbors, while the United States maintained dominance in the Region.
The defeat in the current confrontation with Iran will have an entirely different character. It cannot be repaired or ignored. There will be no return to the previous status quo, no American triumph that will undo the damage done. The Strait of Hormuz will no longer be “open” as it once was. With control of this strait, Iran emerges as the main player in the Region and one of the key actors in the world. The role of China and Russia, as Iran’s allies, is strengthened, while that of the United States is significantly weakened. Far from demonstrating American power, as the supporters of the war claimed, this conflict has revealed an America that is unreliable and incapable of finishing what it started. And this will cause a chain reaction around the world, as friends and enemies will adapt to American failure. President Trump likes to talk about who “holds the cards,” but it is not clear whether he still has any good cards left to play.
The United States and Israel struck Iran with devastating effect for 37 days, killing much of the country’s leadership and destroying most of the military, but they failed to topple the regime or extract even the slightest concession. Now the Trump administration is hoping that a blockade of Iranian ports will achieve what military force could not. That is theoretically possible, but a regime that was not brought to its knees by five weeks of relentless bombing is unlikely to surrender to economic pressure alone. And the regime is not afraid of the anger of its own people. Some supporters of the war are calling for a resumption of military strikes, but they cannot explain how another wave of bombing would achieve what 37 days of bombing did not. Any new military action would push Iran to strike neighboring Persian Gulf states.
Trump halted attacks on Iran not because he was fed up with the war, but because Iran was attacking vital oil and gas infrastructure in the Region. The turning point came on March 18, when Israel bombed the South Pars gas field and Iran retaliated by attacking the Ras Laffan industrial complex in Qatar, the world’s largest natural gas export facility. Trump responded by declaring a moratorium on attacks on Iranian energy infrastructure and then a ceasefire, even though Iran had made no concessions. The danger that forced Trump to back down still remains. Even if the U.S. decided to bomb Iran again, Tehran would still have the ability to launch missiles and drones before the regime fell — if it ever did.
Just a few successful strikes could paralyze the Region’s energy infrastructure for years, plunging the world and the US itself into a deep economic crisis. The analysis states that Trump is considering the possibility of declaring “victory” and withdrawing from the conflict. According to the author, this could be the least bad solution politically, since a longer and more costly war could again end in failure. According to the article, American defeat now seems possible. Iran is expected to retain control of the Strait of Hormuz. The assumption that this sea route will return to its previous state after the crisis is considered unfounded. Iran has no interest in restoring the old status quo. Even the most moderate voices in Tehran understand that the country cannot relinquish control of the strait. According to the analysis, control of Hormuz gives Iran a more powerful strategic weapon than its nuclear program, since Tehran can directly affect global energy supplies.
Iran could impose transit tariffs, restrict entry to certain countries, or use the threat to maritime transport as a means of political and economic pressure. In this situation, Israel could find itself more isolated than before, while Iran could become economically and militarily stronger.
The article also argues that Gulf Arab states, which have relied on American hegemony for decades for their security, will be forced to adapt to the new reality and seek more pragmatic relations with Tehran. According to the author, if the US Navy is unable to open the Strait of Hormuz, then no other coalition will be able to do so. The analysis warns that this situation could also trigger a new global naval arms race, as countries dependent on Persian Gulf energy may feel vulnerable. The author emphasizes that the war has also highlighted the weakening of American military reserves and raised questions about the US’s readiness for other major conflicts. This, he says, could affect China’s strategic calculations towards Taiwan or Russia’s towards Europe. The world is increasingly entering a “post-American” order, where the US’s dominant position in the Middle East and beyond is rapidly fading.