By Radoslaw SIKORSKI
The world is a healthier, but not a safer, place, wrote The Economist in 1953, after the death of Joseph Stalin. One of the bloodiest tyrants in history had just died, and the newspaper worried about who and what might come next. It was not alone in this concern. Russian totalitarianism, now familiar, seemed somehow more manageable than whatever the future might bring.
Seven decades later, that sentiment has changed little. No matter what the Kremlin does, the fear that, if we oppose it, it might do something even more reckless is still used as an argument for giving in to Russian demands. Take, for example, a conversation with Andrey Melnichenko, a Russian oligarch, recently published in these pages. He acknowledged that Vladimir Putin had made mistakes, but argued that whatever came next could be even worse; that Russia, if pushed too hard, could “plunge into chaos, brutal autarky, or a bleak and dangerous dependence,” and even “use a tactical nuclear weapon.” The conclusion was clear: let Russia do as it pleases, or there will be consequences. This is a no-win approach.
For years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West did its best not to humiliate Russia and to turn it into a responsible actor in the international system. Only in 1997 was Moscow invited to join the G7, signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and entered into a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, every American presidential administration has tried to bring Russia closer to the West, whether by signing treaties, looking its leader “deep in the eye,” or pressing the “reset” buttons. Former Soviet satellite states, including Poland, have done the same.
In 2009, Mr. Putin was invited to attend ceremonies in Westerplatte, Poland, to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II. My country established a visa-free program for Russians living near our border, in the Kaliningrad enclave. The heads of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Polish Roman Catholic Church issued a joint appeal, calling for “forgiveness for mistakes, injustices, and every evil committed against each other.” Even today, I am personally attacked by our opposition for saying that I could imagine a truly democratic Russia joining NATO, once it met all the criteria.
We all tried. And we all got rejected. Today, almost five years after it launched the bloodiest war in Europe since 1945, Russia is again trying to impose its will by threatening escalation. It recently warned Britain of “consequences” for providing military aid to Ukraine. The visit of John Ratcliffe, the director of the CIA, to Moscow this month was reportedly an attempt to warn the Kremlin against attacking a NATO member state.
And yet, while the Russian leader shows no willingness to reach a peace deal – short of Ukraine’s surrender – many still refuse to accept reality. Some argue that Russia has been so weakened by mounting economic and military pressure that the West must negotiate before the regime collapses, or worse, before the state disintegrates and produces even more dangerous successors to Mr. Putin. Others insist that Russia should not be pushed too far, because it could respond with further escalation, including in the nuclear field. Both arguments are wrong.
Fears that continued pressure would lead to the breakup of the state are exaggerated. Russia’s highly centralized political system has made its Regions economically, administratively, and financially dependent on Moscow. Millions of citizens rely on transfers from the federal budget, while even resource-rich Regions depend on centrally controlled transport and energy infrastructure. Russia is not the Soviet Union. Outside the North Caucasus, ethnic Russians make up the vast majority of the population, and the memory of the economic crisis and political chaos that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet Union continues to fuel separatist sentiment. Last but not least, the country has been centralized for centuries. Major political changes have historically begun in Moscow, not in the Regions. Even in the event of a leadership crisis or a severe military defeat, the most likely outcome would be a struggle within the ruling elite for control of the center, not the breakup of the state.
Threats of escalation – made either by the authorities or suggested by oligarchs who claim to be concerned – are not reactions to new crises, but part of a long-standing strategy.
Today, as in the past, Russia is testing the West through force. Soviet military doctrine called this tactic razvedka boyem, “reconnaissance through combat.” Limited attacks were used to discover an adversary’s positions, strengths, and weaknesses before launching a larger offensive. The Kremlin has applied the same principle ever since. In its current war against Western democracies, it uses drones, cyberattacks, sabotage, GPS jamming, and information warfare. These are not random provocations. They are carefully calibrated tests of our resolve. The question is no longer whether Russia is probing and testing NATO. The question is whether NATO understands that it is being tested, and what signal it intends to send to prevent actions in the gray area from escalating into direct confrontation.
The Kremlin operates on a simple assumption: not that Russia is stronger, but that democratic opponents will be reluctant to test its weaknesses. Europe should therefore resist the temptation to engage in premature negotiations. Those calling for the reopening of political dialogue may hope that discussions will ultimately reduce tensions. In the long run, the opposite is true. Dialogue initiated before Russia’s strategic position has been sufficiently weakened could strengthen the Kremlin’s legitimacy at home, encourage further hybrid operations, weaken European support for Ukraine, and deepen divisions within our democratic community.
The uncomfortable truth is that Europe must accept greater risk in the short term to avoid much more serious risks in the future. Our goal cannot be simply to avoid escalation. It must be to convince Mr. Putin and the Russian people that escalation will get them nowhere and that we are willing to sacrifice more than money to protect ourselves. We have the means and the capacity to do so. The primary responsibility of European leaders is to protect their people from Russian threats, not to protect Russia from itself.
Russia considers us an enemy and wants to destroy our democratic civilization. We should not rush to appease or appease it. When Mr. Putin is ready for peace, he will find a way to communicate this.