The politics of Poland’s judicial crisis

Tusk received an early warning at the start of his current term when his government forcibly seized control of public television, which PiS had illegally turned into a party propaganda machine.

By Maciej KISILOWSKI

Dramatic scenes are unfolding at Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal, as speculation rages over whether Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s government and the Tribunal’s judges, chosen by his liberal parliamentary majority, are acting within the law. Many will ask whether democrats should break the law to restore institutions sabotaged by populist authoritarians. In the Polish case, that is the wrong question. Legally, the issue is simple and supports Tusk’s actions. Eleven years ago, the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party illegally appointed three judges to the Constitutional Tribunal.

Two years later, PiS passed a law that illegally shortened the terms of office of the judicial members of the National Council of Magistracy, the constitutional body responsible for nominating judges to all courts in the country except the Tribunal. It replaced them with PiS appointees, creating a politically controlled body outside the bounds of Poland’s constitution. When the democratic opposition led by Tusk returned to power in 2023, more than 2 people had been appointed or promoted to judicial positions through an unconstitutional procedure that had been repeatedly condemned by Polish and European courts and by dozens of constitutional law scholars around the world. The legal consequences should be clear. The three PiS-appointed members of the Constitutional Tribunal have never been judges. The decisions in which they participated should be treated as invalid.

Imagine the President of the United States, Donald Trump, issuing an executive order to appoint two MAGA podcasters as the tenth and eleventh justices of the US Supreme Court. No one would be surprised if a newly elected Democratic administration treated all decisions involving these illegally seated judges as null and void and prosecuted the fraudsters, along with those who helped them. This is precisely the situation in Poland. Therefore, describing recent events as “the removal of the president of the Tribunal” is misleading.

Bogdan Święczkowski, the former deputy minister of justice of the PiS party, has never been the legal president of the court. The General Assembly that nominated him included people who were not judges and were not entitled to participate. Judge Anna Korwin-Piotrowska, who has now taken over the duties of the president, has the full right to act. She was duly elected to the Tribunal. The Tribunal’s procedural law, adopted under PiS itself, identifies the judge who takes over when the presidency is vacant, or when the duties of the president cannot be performed in any other way.

The criterion takes into account previous judicial service, and Korwin-Piotrowska, who has had a long career as a judge, clearly meets the requirements. The individuals who sat on the Tribunal illegally should have long since been removed from its premises, sued by state authorities to recover salaries they were not entitled to, and criminally charged. As non-judges, they have no right to judicial immunity. Poland’s Criminal Code expressly prohibits performing official acts while posing as a public official. None of this happened, because enforcing the law in a deeply divided country came at an extremely high political cost.

Tusk received an early warning early in his current term when his government forcibly seized control of public television, which PiS had illegally turned into a party propaganda machine. Many commentators at home and abroad accused the new government of heavy-handed tactics. But the dangers extended beyond the court of public opinion. What if the Tribunal’s prosecution of a pseudo-judge took precedence over another illegal appointment to an ordinary court?

The willingness of these neo-judges to protect their far-right allies is no secret. The proceedings involving former PiS Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro and his former deputy, Marcin Romanowski – both of whom fled Poland and face charges of embezzlement of public funds and abuse of office – are a clear example. Prosecutors secured the exclusion of one judge from Ziobro’s European arrest warrant proceedings, citing her irregular appointment and professional ties to Ziobro. But in September, another irregularly appointed judge ruled that Romanowski should receive conditional protection from detention. Of course, rigorous enforcement of the law would require the removal and prosecution of every one of the thousands of illegal judicial appointees. But that would cause political chaos.

How would voters react if the removal of a significant part of the judiciary blocked the courts? How would the “old”, legally appointed judges respond? Would the police continue to enforce court orders? These are not abstract questions. Poland’s right-wing parties insist that their illegal position is the only legal one, and that anyone who helps restore the rule of law is participating in a coup d’état punishable by life imprisonment.

Speaking outside the Tribunal, PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński again threatened retaliation against those involved, citing the “Nuremberg principles.” For a judge, police officer or civil servant, the threat is concrete, as lawyers around the world are learning from the Trump administration’s campaign of retaliation. US officials who participated in the perfectly legal investigations and prosecutions of Trump for his role in the attack on the US Capitol on January 6, 2021, are now being prosecuted and prosecuted. So acting in accordance with the law will not protect anyone from the wrath of a future far-right government. Recent opinion polls suggest that next year’s general elections could return PiS to power.

The most dramatic episode of the current escalation – the night-time physical harassment by the powerful president Karol Nawrocki of the young Korwin-Piotrowska at the entrance to the Tribunal – may indicate that law enforcement agencies are hesitating. The president’s actions were clearly illegal. He has no authority to decide who runs a court by forcefully entering it. However, the police and the State Protection Service, which answer to Tusk’s government, not the president, did not prevent Nawrocki’s raid. These are big problems. Calling them a paradox of the rule of law makes them harder to solve because it rewards the tactics of populists. The more completely they capture the state, and the more shamelessly they threaten public officials, the more legitimacy we give to their claim to legality. Tusk’s government has no shortage of legal arguments. It is trying to build the political authority to implement them.

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