The problem is not that the United States doesn’t know how to fight. The problem is that it routinely fights the wrong wars, for the wrong objectives. This undermines allies’ confidence in American strategic judgment and makes it harder to compete with real rivals, like China.
By Stephen M. WALT
If you’re an American, you’re probably tired of losing wars. I know I am. And you’re probably wondering, “Why does this keep happening?” It’s a paradox that’s as intriguing as it is frustrating: Although the United States has been, for many decades, the most powerful country in the world, with an unparalleled military budget and fighting capabilities, its record in recent history is largely one of defeat.
This includes the current war with Iran, which has yet to achieve any of the Trump administration’s stated objectives and which will likely end up leaving Iran in a significantly stronger strategic position. Let’s take them in turn. The Korean War ended in a draw (more on that later). Vietnam was a clear defeat, as were the Iraq War and the “endless war” in Afghanistan. The Kosovo War of 1999 can hardly be called a triumph, as Serbia managed to secure, at the end of the conflict, more favorable terms than those offered before the fighting began.
If we exclude the invasion of Grenada, a small island nation, in 1983 (a confrontation so unequal that it can hardly be taken seriously as an indicator), then the only clear American victory during all these decades was the 1991 Gulf War.
Yes, I know: The United States and its allies “won” the Cold War. But that’s the exception that proves the rule, because it was a “war” that never involved direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union. Why, then, has the United States had such a poor balance sheet? It’s certainly not for lack of money, given the size of the U.S. defense budget and the willingness of Congress to approve additional funds whenever asked.
It is not a question of a lack of firepower either, as the United States continues to be extremely capable of destroying targets, even at considerable distances from its shores.
That ability may be somewhat weakened now, given the way US President Donald Trump and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have squandered the country’s stockpile of advanced missiles in their ill-advised war on Iran. But even that factor doesn’t explain why victory has been so difficult to achieve. Nor is it because of a lack of courage in the ranks of the US armed forces, whose members continue to be willing to put themselves in harm’s way, often with heroic displays. And it certainly isn’t because US soldiers lack testosterone, despite what the country’s irresponsible Secretary of Defense (or losing a war) might think.
In fact, the reasons why the United States continues to lose wars are strategic and structural. The country has been involved in wars of its own choosing, where relatively narrow American interests have been intertwined with extremely ambitious objectives, such as trying to reshape a foreign society according to the American model.
As a result, adversaries have usually been much more determined than Washington, because for them there has been much more at stake. They are fighting to survive or, at least, to maintain their independence and autonomy. The United States, on the other hand, is, in most cases, fighting to achieve objectives that may be considered desirable but that are, ultimately, not vital to its interests. In these circumstances, it is to be expected that adversaries will be much more willing to make sacrifices than the United States. As in most, if not all, asymmetric conflicts, the weaker side does not win by achieving a decisive victory on the battlefield, but by avoiding defeat and waiting until the greater power realizes that sending more soldiers and spending more money on a dead-end conflict is simply not worth it.
This simple formula helps us understand a lot about all these recent wars.
On the Korean Peninsula, the United States was defending important interests, as an uncontested communist victory there could have significantly influenced the course of the Cold War in Asia. But China viewed American efforts to unify the peninsula as an existential threat and ultimately sacrificed at least 200 soldiers (and probably many more) to prevent this outcome. After three years of fierce fighting, the result was essentially a draw. In Vietnam, the United States faced the powerful nationalism of the Vietnamese communist movement, a force that had previously defeated French colonial rule and that proved impossible to quell.
Although American leaders managed, for a time, to convince citizens that preventing a communist victory was a vital interest – largely by stoking exaggerated fears of the domino effect of the spread of communism – in the end, they lost credibility.
The American public opposed a war that seemed to have no end, forcing the United States to withdraw and paving the way for Hanoi’s ultimate triumph. Many of the same factors also led to the unfortunate endings of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Saddam Hussein was a persistent troublemaker, but by 2003 he had been brought under control, his weapons programs dismantled, and he had played absolutely no role in the September 11 terrorist attacks. Therefore, removing him from power was not a vital interest for the United States, despite the claims of neoconservatives who dreamed of transforming the Middle East into a Region filled with pro-American democracies. Removing Saddam from power was easy (which showed how little danger he actually posed), but the occupying forces were soon faced with a powerful insurgency that opposed foreign rule and was supported by both Iran and Syria.
These two countries had no desire to become the next targets on Washington’s list. Another ambitious war, undertaken by choice, ended in costly failure.
Doesn’t this story sound familiar? In Afghanistan, a combination of ignorance, idealism, and limited strategic relevance ultimately led to the failure of the American war effort. Washington had good reason to pursue Osama bin Laden and the Taliban who harbored him. But staying there, with the goal of transforming Afghanistan into a Western-style democracy, provoked fierce resistance from a society that had fully earned its reputation as the “graveyard of empires.” In the end, the insurgents were more interested in driving the United States out than the Americans themselves were in defeating them—if such a thing had been possible at all.
Ultimately, Trump during his first term and then President Joe Biden decided to end a conflict that had long since become a pointless endeavor. The 1991 Gulf War is the clear exception to Washington’s unimpressive record.
In the strict sense of the word, it was also a war of choice, as the United States could have allowed Iraq to hold Kuwait without facing any immediate threat to its security. However, over time, Iraq’s control of Kuwait and its oil revenues could have altered the balance of power in the Gulf Region in troubling ways. Moreover, the George H.W. Bush administration was concerned that allowing such aggression, unopposed, could set a dangerous precedent.
But, what is very important, in this case the American objectives were fully commensurate with the interests of the United States.
The United States and its allies expelled Iraq from Kuwait, severely weakened Iraq’s military power, and imposed strict and intrusive United Nations inspections that dismantled its weapons programs. But Bush wisely decided not to “march on Baghdad” to overthrow the regime, because such an action would have exceeded the powers granted by the UN Security Council and would have forced the United States to occupy and govern a divided and hostile society. Since American objectives were aligned with the country’s interests, and Bush ended the war shortly after achieving them, it is rightly considered a remarkable success.
However, it is not easy for a superpower to achieve a match between its interests and objectives. Because the United States is so powerful and objectively so secure, there are few conflicts where its vital interests are truly at stake and where great sacrifices – such as those made by the Americans during World War II – can be easily justified. At the same time, American power and its technological superiority make it easy to intervene in a wide variety of countries and lead policymakers to convince themselves that these conflicts will be easily won.
In short, the problem is not that the United States doesn’t know how to fight. The problem is that it routinely fights the wrong wars, for the wrong objectives. This undermines allies’ confidence in American strategic judgment and makes it harder to compete with real rivals, like China.
Why does this phenomenon continue to recur, even under a president who claimed to be against endless wars and insisted that he was the “peace candidate”? The reasons are many, but one of them is the continued reluctance of the American foreign policy elite to take responsibility for its actions and learn from the mistakes of the past.
A perfect illustration of this problem can be found in Robert Kagan’s recent interview with Responsible Statecraft. Admittedly, Kagan has publicly criticized Trump’s war on Iran. However, he has consistently been a supporter of a US foreign policy based on the use of force and one of the most vocal public supporters of the Iraq War. When asked whether that war had been a mistake, he replied: “I’m not sure what the value is in admitting that it was a mistake. It’s not going to bring anyone back to life.” He added that his main regret was that the war had weakened public support for the kind of interventionist foreign policy he advocated.
As long as the reluctance to admit mistakes and take responsibility remains widespread in foreign policy circles – now including much of the MAGA movement – Americans will have to get used to disappointments.
(Stephen M. Walt is a professor of international relations at Harvard University and a columnist for Foreign Policy magazine.)

