The operation to oust Maduro makes it clear that the recently released U.S. National Security Strategy must be taken seriously and that the Trump administration sees the Western Hemisphere as a Region where U.S. interests take precedence. Russia and China will welcome this as a sign that Trump shares their vision of a world divided into spheres of influence, in which governments in Moscow and Beijing have the upper hand in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, respectively. A global order that has held together for 80 years is on the verge of being replaced by three Regional orders that are likely to be anything but orderly – or free.
By Richard HAAS
Nicolás Maduro is now the former president of Venezuela, a prisoner held in the United States. His overthrow at the hands of US Special Forces, however, is better understood as the end of the beginning than the beginning of the end.
As far as I know, few people in Venezuela, or anywhere else, will mourn the fall of Maduro. He was an autocrat who stole elections, repressed his own people, wrecked the country’s economy despite its vast oil reserves, and engaged in drug trafficking. But that doesn’t mean this military operation was either justified or wise. In fact, its legality is questionable. It was also questionable in terms of strategic value: Maduro hardly posed any immediate threat to the United States. There is no doubt about it: this was a military operation of choice, not necessity.
There are some superficial similarities between this operation and the one undertaken by President George HW Bush in 1989 to overthrow Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega. But at that time there was a stronger legal basis for Noriega, which included not only drugs but also the murder of a U.S. serviceman. There were also legitimate concerns about the threat to other U.S. military personnel stationed in Panama and the security of the Panama Canal itself.
The choice to target Venezuela sheds light on President Donald Trump’s motive. The top priority, as Trump himself suggested in his post-operation press conference, was American access to Venezuela’s oil reserves, the world’s largest. Secondary goals include ending Venezuela’s involvement in the drug trade, helping to repatriate those who have deserted it, and tightening the noose around Cuba, which is heavily dependent on subsidized Venezuelan oil to keep its struggling, sanctions-hit economy afloat. But it would be reckless in the extreme to declare the operation a success. It is one thing to remove an individual from power. It is another, fundamentally different and more difficult undertaking, to overthrow a regime and replace it with something more benign and stable. In the case of Venezuela, former US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s “Pottery Barn rule” applies: We broke it, now it belongs to us.
Trump has declared that the US will “lead Venezuela.” Details are scarce, and it is not clear whether this will require an invading army. One thing is clear, at least for now: The Trump administration prefers to cooperate with the remnants of the existing regime (it appears to have reached an understanding with Maduro’s vice president, who is running the government) rather than empower the opposition. This is consistent with a policy motivated by the prospect of commercial gain, rather than a commitment to promoting democracy and protecting human rights.
All potential problems can be ruled out, but the main one – division by order – must be openly acknowledged. Pro-regime elements will remain active, and the opposition is far from united and could easily resist exclusion. Such unknowns could produce difficult policy choices for the US, in terms of what it would be willing to do to shape developments if they spiral out of control.
The operation captures the essence of Trump’s foreign policy. It was unilateral to the core. It paid little attention to legality or international opinion. It focused on the Western Hemisphere rather than Europe, the Indo-Pacific, or the Middle East. The goal was commercial gain, in this case access to oil reserves, and strengthening internal security, reflecting concerns about drugs and immigration. Military force was used, but in limited ways.
The biggest weakness of the operation in Venezuela may be the precedent it sets, affirming the right of great powers to intervene in their own neighborhood against leaders they deem illegitimate or a threat. One can only imagine Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has talked about “denazifying” Ukraine and removing President Volodymyr Zelensky, approving of the logic. Trump’s military operation in Venezuela makes a negotiated end to the war between Russia and Ukraine even more distant than it already is. A similar reaction is possible in China, which sees Taiwan as a breakaway province of its own and its government as illegitimate. This does not mean that President Xi Jinping will suddenly act on his ambitions for Taiwan, but developments in Venezuela may increase his confidence that he will succeed if he invades, surrounds, or directly coerces this island.
The operation to oust Maduro makes it clear that the recently released U.S. National Security Strategy must be taken seriously and that the Trump administration sees the Western Hemisphere as a Region where U.S. interests take precedence. Russia and China will welcome this as a sign that Trump shares their vision of a world divided into spheres of influence, in which governments in Moscow and Beijing have the upper hand in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, respectively. A global order that has held for 80 years is on the verge of being replaced by three Regional orders that are likely to be anything but orderly – or free.