“It’s not a clash of nations,” he says, “but of values.” Kokorich has designed and started producing much of the weaponry that allows Ukraine to defend itself and strike at Russian territory. He is on the verge of a technological revolution that aims to transform warfare itself. He is applying the lessons he learned working alongside Elon Musk.
Entrepreneur Mikhail Kokorich has explained in an interview with the Italian media Corriere della Sera his role in the military and technological developments that are affecting the war in Ukraine. Born in Siberia (near Mongolia and China) and today stripped of Russian citizenship (there is an arrest warrant against him), he is one of the few who can influence the war between Moscow and Kiev. Kokorich is presented as a controversial figure who claims that his company’s technologies are changing the way the conflict between Moscow and Kiev is waged. He studied physics and has a master’s degree from Stanford. In the interview, he explains his vision of “modern warfare”, the cost of weapons and the changing balance in the defense industry in Europe.
“It’s not a clash of nations,” he says, “but of values.” Kokorich has designed and started producing much of the weaponry that allows Ukraine to defend itself and strike at Russian territory. He is on the cusp of a technological revolution that aims to transform warfare itself. He is applying the lessons he learned working alongside Elon Musk. Is the war in Ukraine what has generated the current wave of European “unicorns” like your company, Destinus, groups valued at over a billion euros?
A ‘unicorn’ represents a financial valuation; in the field of defense, the real test is the ability to continue production – in large volumes, at sustainable costs – when a conflict is prolonged. And the type of production makes a difference. The big historical groups excel in highly sophisticated and certified platforms. However, the war has highlighted the need to build simple and cheap systems: not in dozens of units, but in tens of thousands. And that’s where we come in. But we are not faced with a clash between new realities and traditional giants, we are between two different capabilities that Europe needs.
Is it true that your missiles cost one-tenth of those American Tomahawks or German Tauruses?
More or less yes, and the exact number is less important than its meaning. A real deterrent is not based on a few hundred extremely sophisticated systems, but on tens of thousands of effective tools. At 3 or 4 million euros per unit, no public budget could afford their massive purchase.
And is it true that you at Destinus produce missiles for Ukraine ten times faster than large traditional groups?
We produce about 200 per month. The entire European production of long-range systems of the same category reaches a similar figure in a year.
Do you get feedback from Ukrainians who are fighting?
This is why systems evolve so quickly.
So you are disrupting a high-cost sector, and European taxpayers could spend much less to acquire defense capabilities?
The issue is not so much about disrupting a sector as about increasing the return on investment for every euro spent. But this is not because traditional industry is inefficient or expensive. Its systems are designed for a different threat, in an era when a few precision weapons were enough. Today, the threat has changed. Both types of systems are needed.
How does this approach change war?
It changes the geometry of the battlefield. For a century, the front line was defined by the range of artillery, a few dozen kilometers. Today it is expanding dramatically.
Europe hasn’t experienced a conflict in generations. Could Moscow use the capabilities it gained in Ukraine against a European country?
Nobody knows. The Russians have spent three or four years immersed in modern warfare, learning its dynamics on an industrial scale. In Europe, meanwhile, our success exposes us: we are an open, tightly connected, just-in-time civilization, relying on energy, logistics, and data networks that were never built to withstand attack. A society at war is strengthened; a prosperous, peaceful society is fragile, and an attack on these weaknesses would be devastating. So you cannot base your security on Russia’s intentions; you must build a capacity that makes any attempt at aggression untenable.
You grew up in Russia. Now you produce weapons that hit Russia. Why?
Yes, I was born in Russia. But I have also seen how the country has descended into authoritarianism and aggression. I understand the ambitions and methods of the Russian state better than many people in Western Europe. However, I do not consider this a personal war. Russia is no longer my country: I am no longer its citizen. This is not a war between nationalities; it is a clash of political systems. I opposed Vladimir Putin from the beginning and left Russia a long time ago. I think of the Italians who fought against Mussolini, against their compatriots. I feel something similar. I am not against the Russian people: Russia is a cultural part of Europe. The tragedy is that a regime has pushed Russia off that path. Defeating it is not an act against Russia, but in its interest.
(Corriere della Sera)