The era of “defense” is over and the era of “war” has begun. The fragmentation of the EU, often treated as a technical issue, is now a grave liability, while defense spending, once seen as discretionary, is now a matter of survival. Whatever happens next, Europe cannot turn a blind eye to the existential nature of the security challenges it faces – or to America’s instability as a partner. It must become a strategic actor in its own right.
By Ana PALACIO
In recent weeks, unidentified drones have violated European Union airspace, prompting an emergency meeting of European leaders, hosted by Denmark. In fact, such violations have increased sharply over the past three months, as at least ten countries – from Poland and Romania to the Baltic states and even France – have reported suspicious drone activity. The trend highlights how exposed Europe is to security threats related to Russia’s hybrid warfare campaign. But perhaps the greatest threat to Europe’s security comes from the United States, where President Donald Trump’s administration is pursuing a foreign policy approach that combines isolationism with confrontation.
The Trump administration has made no secret of its disdain for America’s security commitments, including those to NATO allies. US Vice President JD Vance’s lengthy speech at the Munich Security Conference in February – in which European leaders were told that the greatest threat to their security comes “from within” – is a case in point. While the Trump administration claims it is simply demanding that NATO countries meet their obligations, particularly on defense spending, it would be naive for Europe to rely on the US to fulfill its part of the bargain.
For the Trump administration, “America First” is not just a slogan; it is a political ethos used to justify a closed, unstable, and transactional approach without a basis in rules, norms, or values. But it is not actually “America” that comes first; it is Trump and his inner circle, who have amassed staggering wealth since returning to the White House. Trump’s new executive order offering full security guarantees to Qatar—which recently gave the US a $400 million plane that Trump is now modifying to serve as a new version of “Air Force One”—shows how unpredictable and opportunistic American foreign policy has become.
Now, however, the Trump administration has shifted from a transactional approach to a confrontational one. In an extraordinary meeting at the Quantico Marine Corps base, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth lectured more than 800 military leaders, flown in from around the world at great expense, to promote a “warrior ethos”, to oppose “bullshit” rules of engagement and to reject “woke rubbish”, including “climate change worship”.
But it was Trump himself who best summed up America’s new approach to security, when he announced that the “Department of Defense” would now be called the “Department of War.” (Congress has yet to approve the name change.) This reverses a 1949 decision that was intended to communicate America’s commitment to restraint, legitimacy, and civilian control over the military, at a time when the United States was assuming the role of guarantor of a stable, rules-based world order. The change signals America’s abandonment of the order that has underpinned international relations—including multilateral cooperation and mutually beneficial economic engagement—for more than eight decades.
As far as I know, this was more confirmation of a political shift than new news. While the US has reaped untold benefits from its dominant position within the rules-based international order, the Trump administration has long expressed dissatisfaction with the costs and constraints it brings.
Yet recent U.S. actions echo a more acrimonious world in which skies and sea lanes are contested, supply chains are increasingly fragile, alliances are fraying, displays of force eclipse diplomacy, and the country that once defined global stability is nowhere to be found. In fact, America’s new National Defense Strategy prioritizes “domestic and Regional missions” to protect the “homeland” over efforts to counter threats from powerful adversaries like China and Russia, according to those who have seen the draft.
The rest of the world has already begun to adapt to this new strategic reality. Some countries, such as Australia and Japan, are doubling down on defense cooperation with the United States, hoping that it has not yet lost interest in limiting China’s hegemonic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. Others, such as India, Turkey, and the Gulf states, are sharing the risk through strategic diversification. Europe’s response, however, leaves much to be desired.
Even if a major withdrawal of US forces from Europe is avoided, a reshuffle of troops is almost inevitable. So if a security crisis breaks out – a scenario not far-fetched, given Russia’s hybrid warfare – the EU must be prepared to deal with it. But while Poland, the Baltics and the Nordic countries are moving ahead rapidly with rearmament, other countries are lagging behind. EU-level initiatives – including the European Defence Fund, a joint industrial strategy for defence, the Ammunition Production Support Act, the Defence Industry Strengthening Act through Joint Procurement and the Security Action for Europe financial instrument – are also suffering from fragmentation.
Three priorities stand out. First, Europe must focus on increasing its military capabilities – in ammunition, training and air defence – rather than issuing more communiqués. Second, it must ensure cohesion: sanctions and export controls must be applied uniformly, without exceptions. And finally, Europe must use its economic weight to strengthen its geopolitical position. The EU has the capacity to generate rapid progress on rearmament, including predictable multi-year orders for European industry. But without a unified strategic approach, inefficiencies will drain resources, and cooperation will suffer.
The EU should also benefit from broader cooperation with the UK. But while the new EU-UK Security and Defence Partnership is a step in the right direction, cooperation will not be easy. While the UK government still sees NATO as the cornerstone of British security, it will also aim to take a leading role in coalitions focused on advanced technology, such as AUKUS (with Australia and the US) and the Global Combat Aviation Programme (with Japan and Italy).
The era of “defense” is over and the era of “war” has begun. The fragmentation of the EU, often treated as a technical issue, is now a grave liability, while defense spending, once seen as discretionary, is now a matter of survival. Whatever happens next, Europe cannot turn a blind eye to the existential nature of the security challenges it faces – or to America’s instability as a partner. It must become a strategic actor in its own right.
(Ana Palacio, former Foreign Minister of Spain, former Vice President and General Counsel of the World Bank Group)