When a state can accuse and the accused party cannot respond, the problem is no longer just political, but institutional. The Kosovo case exposes a UN vacuum that requires reform.
By Gurakuç Kuçi
In the United Nations, a paradox that rarely receives attention is when a member can use the rostrum of the General Assembly to raise any accusations against Kosovo, but the latter does not have the right to respond.
Such an asymmetry became apparent again on September 23, when the now former President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, dedicated a long section to Kosovo at the 81st session of the General Assembly, accusing the states that have recognized Kosovo’s independence of violating the UN Charter and international law, then he issued a threat that Serbia would defend its territorial integrity, the Charter and Resolution 1244. His accusations went so far as to accuse Kosovo of “ethnic cleansing” against Serbs.
Serbia, as a member state of the UN, has the right to speak and express its views, but the problem is not with this right. The problem is the institutional issue within which architecture it is articulated, where the party being discussed does not have the right or equivalent status to respond to accusations in the same room.
This issue goes beyond symbolism.
In 2010, the International Court of Justice, as the main judicial organ of the UN, responded to a question raised through the General Assembly following Serbia’s initiative.
The question was: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?” The ICJ answered this question that international law had not been violated, neither the UN Charter, nor Resolution 1244, nor the UNMIK Constitutional Framework had been violated.
This response from the ICJ to Serbia’s initiative makes the current debate paradoxical, where only Serbia is allowed to present its version of international law to the UN and completely deny the ICJ’s response, while Kosovo cannot defend itself and challenge interpretations from the same procedural position.
The problem is not just membership
The General Assembly links the right of reply to delegations through the special status to participate in its proceedings. According to rule 73, the President of the Assembly may grant the right of reply to a member. However, Kosovo, not yet a member of the UN or having any special observer status in the PA, does not automatically enjoy this mechanism.
But there is precedent from the past when the PA has granted special participation rights to various delegations, including the right of reply. This does not resolve the issue of membership but creates a mechanism that enables a non-member party to participate in a more substantial way in debates that directly affect it.
The paradox becomes even greater when Kosovo, although not recognized by countries such as China, India or Spain, conducts regular trade with them and is part of the international system of goods circulation, payments and customs procedures. China alone accounts for over a tenth of Kosovo’s imports. Thus, political non-recognition has not prevented economic and legal interaction in practice; however, in the UN, the political status continues to deny Kosovo the opportunity to respond to the accusations made against it.
Kosovo’s membership remains a prey to political issues stemming from the veto of Russia and China in the UN Security Council, rather than the criteria of international law. This issue rightly raises the need for reform of the organization.
A test for UN reform
In his speech to the UN General Assembly, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called for reform of the United Nations, arguing that the institution is failing to fulfill its mission for which it was created. Such a debate is not new, but has been more prevalent in academic circles than in political ones.
The debate on UN reform usually focuses on the veto, the composition of the Security Council and the representation of emerging powers. The issue of the veto is the part where Russia opposes the most, which is also the main opponent of Kosovo’s membership in the UN and once again made statements against Kosovo regarding the UN Charter and Resolution 1244 that contradict the ICJ’s finding.
Within this request for reform, a fundamental procedural problem must be added as to who has the right to speak when they are the direct object of a state’s debate or speech.
Such a reform would not require that membership status and the right to be heard be treated as the same issue. Instead, the UN could establish a procedural standard under which any party that becomes the direct object of accusations in the General Assembly would have the opportunity to provide a response, regardless of whether it enjoys full member status. This would separate the issue of political status from the basic need for a fair institutional debate.
At the same time, reform should not bypass the problem of membership. When a state’s admission depends on the recommendation of the Security Council, the veto of the permanent powers can turn an issue of international representation into a hostage to geopolitical rivalries. The case of Kosovo shows that the consequences of this deadlock are not limited to the lack of a seat in the UN, but also affect the ability to participate in the debate where it is directly discussed.
Therefore, reform should move in two parallel directions: to review the way political deadlocks affect the accession process and, until then, to create a clear procedural right of reply. This would turn the issue from a status privilege into a standard of institutional justice.