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Friday, March 6, 2026

Possible paths to a solution to the Gaza crisis

Before discussing ways out of this deadlock, it must be established that providing aid to the people of Gaza is non-negotiable and must continue no matter what. This is not only moral, but also strategic, because Hamas sees the suffering of civilians as part of its strategy.

By CNN

Despite the negotiation of the only two ceasefires in the horrific war in Gaza, including the release of nearly 150 hostages, the situation today seems hopeless and destined to simply continue with no clear end in sight. This is unacceptable. This war must end. The hostages must return home. Humanitarian aid must be increased. Gaza needs a multi-year recovery without Hamas at the helm. All of this must start now.

So how? Just two weeks ago, there was hope that Israel and Hamas, through the mediation of the US, Qatar and Egypt, were on the verge of a 60-day ceasefire. That deal included the release of half of the live hostages still held by Hamas, thought to be ten people, in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, including more than a hundred now serving life sentences, along with a 60-day ceasefire and withdrawal of Israeli forces from populated areas, daily increases in humanitarian aid and a commitment by Israel, backed by Trump, to negotiate during those 60 days terms to end the war.

These promising talks reportedly broke down after Hamas leaders living comfortably in Qatar accepted his terms, but Hamas terrorists holding the keys to the hostages inside Gaza said no or imposed new conditions. Israel and the US walked out of the talks, leading to their failure.

In the days that followed, reports emerged of an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in Gaza – largely due to Israel’s decision in March to prevent any aid from entering for nearly 80 days. Israel now faces a crisis of its own making, with the world’s attention focused on its own humanitarian missteps, rather than on Hamas as an obstacle to a ceasefire.

Meanwhile, France has responded with an initiative to recognize the creation of a Palestinian state next month, without asking Hamas for anything in advance or explaining how such an initiative could help end the crisis any time soon. The United Kingdom has gone a step further and said it would recognize a Palestinian state next month if there is no ceasefire, thus guaranteeing that Hamas will not accept one. Hamas, on the other hand, has welcomed these initiatives and has released images of a weakened hostage digging his own grave, making it clear that it has no intention of reaching a deal now.

PROPOSED OPTIONS

Before discussing ways out of this impasse, it must be established that providing aid to the people of Gaza is non-negotiable and must continue no matter what. This is not only moral, but also strategic, because Hamas sees the suffering of civilians as part of its strategy. Israel’s blockade, a tactic the Biden administration never allowed, was a trap for Israel itself, allowing Hamas to turn the tide, even as the group obstructs the ceasefire needed to bring immediate and lasting relief to the population it claims to represent.

Since then, Israel has declared a humanitarian pause in the fighting and restored UN aid deliveries, even at the risk of some diversion to Hamas. This is the right course of action and should continue regardless of which option is chosen in the future to secure the release of the hostages. The options being discussed can be categorized into 5:

  1. Military victory: Supporters of this option, including within the Israeli government, claim that Hamas leaders inside Gaza will never accept a deal. Therefore, Israel has no choice but to further intensify its military campaign, including finding and eliminating the few remaining Hamas leaders in Gaza. The hope is that Hamas’s grip on Gaza will be broken and Israel can then create a new Palestinian entity to secure and govern the Gaza Strip, one that is not Hamas or the existing Palestinian Authority.

But Israel has done just that since May, intensifying its military campaign with five divisions deployed to Gaza. This operation, dubbed “Gideon’s Chariots,” helped eliminate Mohammed Sinwar, Hamas’s leader in Gaza at the time, and capture 70 percent of the Gaza Strip. But Israel also lost over forty soldiers, tragically killed civilians, and did not fundamentally change the equation or lead to a deal. There is no reason to believe that more of the same strategy will yield a different result, and escalating the war now, as international support has reached its lowest point, carries strategic risks for Israel.

  1. Comprehensive deal: Supporters of this option claim that the obstacle to the 60-day ceasefire agreement is its phases, as Hamas has been demanding a permanent end to the war from the start. Thus, Israel should now propose the return of all hostages, dead and alive, in exchange for a complete withdrawal from Gaza, the establishment of a new non-Hamas governing structure, and a large-scale release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails. This could be called the “have it all” option because it suggests that there is a magic key to freeing all hostages, ending the war, and removing Hamas from any significant role in Gaza.

However, from experience with negotiations with Hamas, this proposal is likely to lead to an even more difficult negotiation at first. Hamas will negotiate over every name on a proposed governing council, will demand guarantees such as a UN Security Council resolution against future Israeli operations, will refuse to disarm or relinquish security control, and will demand the release of all Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails. So this is unlikely to be a faster path to a deal that brings about a ceasefire or the return of hostages than the phased deal that the parties almost agreed to just two weeks ago.

Without a doubt, Israel and the US missed an opportunity earlier this year to preserve the agreement they inherited from the Biden administration, an agreement backed by the UN Security Council and which could have been extended through negotiations with a ceasefire in place.

  1. Maintaining a 60-day ceasefire proposal: Supporters of this option believe that the quickest path to stopping the war and ultimately ending it entirely remains the existing phased proposal. Hamas is divided within its ranks, and the US could pressure three influential countries – Qatar, Egypt and Turkey – to demand that Hamas accept the deal, release ten hostages and begin the 60-day pause. Otherwise, it could involve expulsion from Doha for Hamas and its leaders, along with extradition requests to the United States for their role in the killing of Americans, and new sanctions to ensure that they do not establish themselves in other countries, except perhaps Iran, where they would be less effective and vulnerable to Israeli targets.

This pressure, along with international support for the deal, would help sway those within Hamas. International pressure is as important to Hamas as military pressure. The problem with this option now is that the French and British initiatives have removed any such pressure or inducement from Hamas to close any deal, since a Palestinian state has been promised in September, regardless of what happens to the hostages. Hamas sees the creation of a Palestinian state not as an end goal but as a springboard to ending Israel’s existence. Its leaders have considered the French initiative “one of the fruits of October 7,” and Hamas has since shown no willingness to resume talks on the 60-day deal, a point brought to light by the grotesque displays of hostages about to starve to death in the tunnels.

  1. Unilateral humanitarian pause: An extraordinary option could see Israel declare a 30-day pause in major combat operations to alleviate the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Israel would not withdraw its forces from current positions and would retain the right to respond in self-defense, but this would immediately shift the international focus back to Hamas, while also allowing Israeli military forces to rest and regroup.

True, this would allow Hamas to rest and regroup without any hope of a hostage release in the short term, but by easing the aid situation, Israel could strategically benefit by taking this card away from Hamas and demonstrating that it is now correcting its mistakes. It could also demand International Red Cross access to the hostages as a condition of the pause, an urgent matter given the horrific hostage images that Hamas has released in recent days.

The problem with this option is that it says nothing about what happens after the pause, further takes pressure off Hamas, and would be extremely unpopular in Israel, both within the right-wing Israeli government but also within the broader population, including most of the hostage families who rightly demand a process that leads to an agreement – not a unilateral action by Israel that could benefit Hamas without anything in return.

  1. Severing US-Israeli relations: Supporters of this option believe that the US should announce a ban on all further arms sales to Israel and demand that Israel end the war unilaterally, even if Gaza remains under Hamas control.

Some go further and claim that this should happen even without the hostages being released. Their argument is that the overriding priority is to stop the war, and only the United States has the leverage over Israel to force it to do so. As for the hostages, supporters of this argument claim that Netanyahu, not Hamas, is the main obstacle to a deal and that by withholding American military support, the Israelis can make the concessions necessary to conclude a deal.

These arguments are aimed at those who are horrified by the images from Gaza and who want a quick solution. But they would do nothing to stop, let alone end, the war.

Hamas has given no serious indication that it will release all hostages if Israel simply surrenders, and if Hamas remains in charge of Gaza, there is no chance of long-term peace or an internationally supported aid plan that the Gaza Strip so desperately needs.

However, this is a politically motivated and unrealistic option for those who truly want to stop the war. It is also highly unlikely to ever happen. Trump is unlikely to break off relations with Israel, and Israel is unlikely to simply withdraw from Gaza without all the Israeli hostages and without an agreement that ensures Hamas cannot maintain its control there. The combination of options two, three, and four offers an immediate path to alleviating the humanitarian crisis, turning the focus directly on Hamas and exploiting the unconstructive proposals coming from Paris, London, and other capitals.

This new path, call it Option 6, would combine a 30-day unilateral pause in Israeli military operations to alleviate the humanitarian situation with an ultimatum that by the end of the 30 days, Hamas release half of the live hostages in order to extend the ceasefire by 60 days under the existing proposal. From there, it could be followed by a firm commitment, supported by the United States, to negotiate during those 60 days a comprehensive agreement to end the war with a new governing structure in Gaza and the release of all remaining hostages. If Hamas refuses to release half of the remaining hostages after 30 days, then Israel’s unilateral pause would end. Israel could return to military operations, but only after its military has been reorganized and with legitimacy for its objectives somewhat internationally accepted.

This could also hinder the French initiative to recognize Palestinian statehood at the UN General Assembly next month: If, after Israel’s unilateral pause, Hamas has not released ten hostages, then the obstacle to peace would clearly be Hamas. On the other hand, if Hamas releases the ten hostages and enters a 60-day window for negotiations to end the war, then it would make no sense to declare Palestinian statehood at the beginning of this process.

SCENARIO CHANGE

Essentially, this is an opportunity for Israel and the United States to completely change the script, urgently address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and place responsibility for ending the crisis more squarely on Hamas, where it belongs. Trump and Netanyahu may not favor such an option. It is also the only viable option at this point that is likely to achieve what we all want to see: aid distributed throughout Gaza, hostages released from Gaza, and an end to the war with Hamas no longer governing or controlling Gaza.

The alternatives may score rhetorical points, but they will not help anyone in Gaza, not the civilians trapped in this terrible war, not the hostages who have now been in the tunnels for more than 600 days. It is time to change the script. That is option 6.

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