An article by Herbert Kotnik
After the Soviet-era oil pipeline Friendship (or Druzhba) which supplies Hungary and Slovakia with Russian crude oil, was severely damaged on January 27 by an attack attributed to Russia, a heated dispute started between the two EU member states and Ukraine as to whether the pipeline can be repaired and continue to be used. (The two landlock countries, Hungary and Slovakia are allowed to receive Russian crude through the Druzhba pipeline thanks to an open-ended sanctions exemption.)
While Hungary and Slovakia claim that there are no technical obstacles to resuming oil shipments through the pipeline, Ukraine argues that, although repair works are underway, in Ukraine, there are more pressing issues amidst the war than restarting the Druzhba pipeline in order to resume Russian oil shipments to these European countries. In response, Budapest and Bratislava accused Ukraine of blackmail over the interruption of supplies, and Hungary announced its double veto, saying no to both a €90bn loan for Kyiv agreed in last December and the planned 20th sanctions package against Russia. (Von der Leyen was expected to announce the final approval of the €90 billion loan and the 20th package of sanctions on 23 February. In the end, due to the situation around the Friendship pipeline, she did neither.)
Given the abovementioned loan and the next round of sanctions, the European Commission has also been envolved in the dispute between the two member states and Kyiv over the damaged pipeline, but its position has come as a real surprise, considering that the EU’s top body – which is bound to safeguard the interests and energy security of all member states – puts Ukraine’s interests first, rather than those of Hungary and Slovakia.
After Ukraine provided the EU leadership a document saying that it was actively carrying out repair and restoration works on the damaged Friendship pipeline, the Commission has not only took it as an absolute truth but also refrained from questioning Zelenskyy’s words claiming that Hungary and Slovakia use ultimatums and political pressure on Ukraine which ’play into the hands of the aggressor’.
At the same time, von der Leyen has turned a blind eye to the request of the two member states of sending a fact-finding mission to Ukraine to verify the status of the Druzhba pipeline. She has also disregarded the opinion of Bratislava and Budapest that oil is not reaching them via the Druzhba oil pipeline due to political reasons.
According to a source at the European Parliament who has requested anonymity, rumours are circulating within the EP about ongoing discussion between the Commission and the Ukrainian leadership over the timeline when Ukraine should open the Friendship pipeline to Slovakia and Hungary. These behind-the-doors talks are actually part of a coordinated political pressure campaign by the Commission and Kyiv, aimed at preventing the two mentioned member states from using their veto to block the €90 billion loan to Ukraine, the same source says.
When asked why such a clear violation of the European law and an unethical practice has not been brought up in the plenary session of the European Parliament, the answer was that no one in the European Parliament dares to raise an issue that could discredit the Ukrainian leadership or negatively affect Ukraine’s EU membership bid as a number of MEPs and their teams have received threats, even death threats, from Ukrainians.
Increased pressure is likely to be put on Budapest and Bratislava if they continue to block Ukraine’s bid. The ways and the scale of the pressure will depend on the creative fantasy of Ukraine, as it has become clear, von der Leyen would neither prevent nor obstruct Kyiv in its countermeasures; on the contrary, she is ready to support these efforts with the aim of breaking the Hungarian and Slovak positions over Ukraine.
Looking at the situation, it is extremely worrying that EU candidate Ukraine is putting pressure on member states, with the approval and assistance of the European Commission. This particular case has clearly shown that the EU leadership gives priority to the interests of a non-EU country (and totally unfit for accession), over the energy security interests of its existing member states. This is not only really strange but it makes no sense at all, given that protecting the interests of member states is the clear obligation of the Commission.
However, instead of protecting bloc members, the Commission is not only lenient with regard to Kyiv but is encouraging Ukraine, a candidate country, to use unlawful and unethical (or at least, questionable or controversial) tools in the dispute with Slovakia and Hungary.
In this situation, von der Leyen not only puts Ukraine’s political interests first and some of the member states’s economic interests second, but she herself is clearly motivated by her own political goals which is, to bring Ukraine into the EU as soon as possible (but not later than 2027) against Hungary’s and Slovakia’s opposition, provide the war-torn country large-scale financial and military support and, to approve as many sanstions packages against Russia as it is possible.
This power game von der Leyen has launched, has shown that she is not afraid of causing serious troubles to member states’, even putting their energy supplies in danger, as well as she does not really care about that the two European countries pay a very high price for a long-running dispute with Ukraine over the repair and restoration of the damaged Druzhba pipeline.
The sad conclusion from the above situation is that Friendship pipeline is no longer about friendship with non-EU countries, nor is it about solidarity and good relations within the EU.