By Nathalie TOCCI
It is a NATO summit where the absence of news is news itself. Ankara’s program has been reduced to a minimum: the less time for discussions and the shorter the final statement, the less danger. The danger, or rather the threat, comes not from what enemies like Vladimir Putin might do, but from what “ally” Donald Trump might say.
This has been carefully worked out. The US president has been demanding that European and Canadian partners spend more on defence, and that is exactly what they are doing. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte presents impressive figures. Not counting the United States, NATO member countries have spent a full $139 billion more on defence last year alone. A good part of these funds have ended up in the American defence industry, creating nearly 200 jobs in the US. These figures have been repeated over and over again during the summit, with one sole purpose: to appease Trump and convince him that he is not being fooled.
Few believe that this is enough to guarantee a real American commitment to the defense of European allies, should the need arise. And no one rules out the possibility that this need will arise. All the more so if Ukraine manages to defend itself increasingly well, creating a de facto freeze on the front line.
Putin, who cannot afford to see an end to the war on which his regime’s survival depends, may be tempted to shift the conflict elsewhere, perhaps by crossing the border into a NATO country. But there is less and less hope that American silence would prevent him from taking such a step. Beyond the tragicomic spectacle, the essence is different. It is clear that the United States wants to withdraw from European security, both because of priorities and costs. The fate of a much more Europeanized NATO seems equally inevitable. Today, the United States provides about half of the conventional forces in Europe. It is likely that within a few years, albeit gradually, this presence will be halved, while the American nuclear umbrella in Europe will remain unchanged. It is an optimistic but essentially realistic scenario. NATO will be weaker, perhaps, but more European, and still strong enough to protect the continent from the Russian threat. Ultimately, this is the objective we are working towards.
However, there are two nodes that risk undermining the future of the Alliance, even if it becomes more European.
The first would be put to the test if Russia were to attack a NATO country in the coming months or years. Such a situation would risk a split within the Alliance. If, for example, the Baltic states were attacked, not to mention Poland, and if the United States were to stand aside, it is very likely that Germany, where rearmament is already a reality, would remain loyal to its commitment to collective defense. France and the United Kingdom would follow suit, making it very likely that other countries, including Italy, would join the common effort. This would mark the end of NATO as a transatlantic alliance, but not the end of a European collective defense, which could also include Canada and perhaps Turkey.
The second node would appear in a less dramatic scenario: the war in Europe may not expand beyond Ukraine, but the conflict with Russia is destined to continue, forcing Europeans to take on ever greater responsibilities for the continent’s defense. These responsibilities must also correspond to greater decision-making weight within the Alliance. In short, a more Europeanized NATO would cease to be an organization traditionally led by the United States.
Today, however, this is not Washington’s account. Trump’s anger at European allies, who imposed modest restrictions on the use of weapons in the war against Iran, while refusing to serve as combatants, demonstrates his conviction that the US is NATO’s majority shareholder. Mark Rutte’s excessive condescension to Trump has only strengthened this conviction in Washington.
But if tomorrow the Europeans were to truly become the dominant force within the Alliance, would the United States, regardless of who is in the White House, be willing to accept a European defense market that is less open to American industry? Or that some NATO operational decisions would no longer be made primarily by the United States? If rights and responsibilities do not go hand in hand, the risk is that the unwritten contract that holds the organization together will be broken. When I ask this question to my NATO colleagues, they acknowledge it, but shrug their shoulders. They say it is a problem that, at best, will arise tomorrow. And it will be a miracle if the Alliance arrives intact by then.