It took almost two years for the protest to become a credible alternative to defeating Aleksandar Vučić. The students organized door-to-door meetings, were supported by Germany and Britain, maintained a common message, and avoided dependence on a single leader. The challenge was to unite people of different persuasions and convince them that discontent could produce a different government.
This was the political construction that victory required. Vučić’s long-term rule had to take the form of an opposition organization that could win elections. For us who live in the Balkans, this is important because it opens up the possibility that a long-term rule can be challenged even outside the borders of the traditional opposition. Seeing this result from Tirana and Prishtina, my mind goes to how this might be reflected on us, the Albanians.
The Student List should now have the majority to form a government without a coalition partner. This gives it greater freedom of action and direct responsibility for the results. Positions that could have been left vague until yesterday to keep the protest united must now be turned into governing decisions.
For us in Kosovo, we must make a distinction here. The democratization of Serbia is not the same process as the acceptance of Kosovo’s independence. Ilija Srdanović, the first on the Student List, has reiterated the Serbian constitutional claim on Kosovo and has not given a clear commitment to the implementation of the Ohrid and Washington agreements. Therefore, for us the first change may come in the manner of dialogue, while the position on status remains the same.
A new government may initially feel constrained by the need to preserve its unity and protect itself from nationalist accusations from Vučić’s party. However, if agreements become more transparent and institutions are held accountable for their implementation, the dialogue could gain credibility.
Meanwhile, the most direct change could affect the Serbian List in Kosovo. It had linked its support for Vučić to continued institutional aid from Serbia, while some of its opponents supported the Student List. This division could take on new weight after the change in Belgrade.
The Serbian List’s claim that it alone can secure Serbia’s support is at risk. If employment, funding, and institutional communication are opened up beyond party loyalty, citizens may feel freer to elect other representatives. Serious loss of support is possible, but will depend on the behavior of the new government and the ability of existing structures to adapt.
For Kurti, I see here an opportunity that goes beyond weakening an opponent. Kosovo can gain a more independent Serbian representation, with which to negotiate about daily life and the functioning of institutions. I would say clearly to the Kosovo Parliament and the Government that it must accept this pluralism even when it produces Serbian politicians who oppose it.
But a more democratic Serbia could also become a more difficult diplomatic interlocutor. The new leaders could defend the same stance on Kosovo with more international credibility. Kurti will have to respond with concrete proposals, security guarantees and a willingness to implement. Objecting to Vučić’s biography and style of governance will no longer be enough as an argument against the new Belgrade. And the Association is the first proof of viability. Kurti will certainly do so by justifying that we now have a democratic government in Serbia.
Rama’s result comes from two directions. In the Region, he will have to rebuild relations with Serbia after long cooperation with Vučić and joint investment in the Berlin process. Within Albania, the Serbian result weakens the argument that the lack of a convincing opposition among the existing parties ensures endless continuity in power.
And here I come to Berisha. For me, one of the most necessary changes in Albania is for him to lose his monopoly on the alternative to Rama. He should go first.
As long as Rama’s departure is presented as Berisha’s return, the government can shift the debate from responsibility for governance to fear of the opponent. This narrows the citizens’ choice and protects the government from some of the costs of its own mistakes.
The fate of Dacic and Milosevic’s former party makes this warning even more concrete. According to the reported results, the Socialist Party (SPS) remained below the threshold and outside parliament. A party’s history and organization do not ensure its eternal representation. The PD must understand that voters may seek another alternative. But its collapse without the emergence of a credible force would strengthen Rama. Change requires new competition, responsible leadership, and a program that goes beyond the departure of one man.
This is also why the Student List in Serbia taught a lesson that it cannot be used as a justification to force the removal of a government through violence. The Student List showed the weight of organization and the vote. That is why I believe that Rama becomes truly replaceable when citizens can judge his governance without feeling forced to accept it as protection from the return of Berisha.
But the consequences of this outcome go beyond relations within the Balkans. During Vučić’s government, Belgrade deepened relations with Russia and China, while continuing to present EU membership as a goal. The European Parliament, in a resolution of 8 July 2026, expressed concern about the growing influence of the two countries and called for a clearer European orientation.
Therefore, the loss of Vučić could also change the geopolitical balance in which we Albanians have a direct interest. However, Moscow and Beijing have interests that go beyond the relationship with him. Russia maintains its weight through energy and support for the Serbian position on Kosovo at the UN. We in Kosovo must be clear that these ties do not disappear with the change of government.
The Student List has even declared that it will maintain its policy of not imposing sanctions on Russia. This is a concrete reason not to read its victory as an immediate break with Moscow.
But for us Albanians, this story remains incomplete without America. Washington supported the European direction of the dialogue (2011-2017) while Germany strengthened its role with the Berlin Process in 2014 but lost it along the way due to the refugee crisis from the Arab Spring. Meanwhile, Russia was increasingly openly using Serbia in its confrontation with the West, on energy and political ties built earlier. In my reading, the weakness was that Europe’s economic weight did not translate into sufficient political determination to discipline Serbia.
American diplomatic reengagement became more visible in 2019, with the appointments of Palmer and Chris Hill. America had maintained its security presence, but now sought more direct influence over political agreements. Sanctions on the oil company NIS (Serbian Oil Industry) in 2025 also showed a willingness to target Russian economic interests in Serbia. These are concrete steps, although they do not constitute an unchanged policy between US administrations.
Therefore, the orientation of the new Serbia will also depend on American engagement and coordination with Europe.
For Edi Rama and Albin Kurti, the issue is what obligations Belgrade will take in exchange for rapprochement with the West. Our interest is that this rapprochement produces security and respect for Kosovo’s statehood. Otherwise, the government in Serbia may change, while the burden of compromise will be asked again from the Albanians and Albin Kurti in particular.
We will have a situation like in the distant year when Milosevic fell and then Djindjic was killed. And Boris Tadic completely failed in building a European Serbia.
For China, the test will be different. The relationship includes investments, infrastructure and long-term agreements, because in May 2026, Belgrade and Beijing signed new cooperation documents, including a plan for the years 2026–2028. The new Student List government will have to decide how much of this relationship it will subject to competition, public scrutiny and European standards. Beijing may adapt to the new leadership, but a more transparent administration could change the terms of cooperation due to the European course.
The support expressed by the European Parliament for the students and the peaceful protest has had political significance. It does not, however, automatically make the next government in line with Brussels and Washington on every issue. Europe now needs to link its rapprochement with Serbia to measurable reforms and concrete benefits for citizens. Only in this way can the change of power be transformed into a lasting change of direction.
In this new political context, the Balkans are entering a period where relationships built around powerful leaders may be reexamined. Russia and China will seek to maintain influence, America and Europe will need to make their rapprochement more credible, while Rama and especially Kurti will face new political demands. The student victory has opened this opportunity. I will judge the depth of this change when the new government in Serbia begins to set the public discourse and concrete decisions on Kosovo. (RFE)