In the Western Balkans, especially in relations between Kosovo and Serbia, artificial intelligence (AI) is adding to the challenges of information manipulation, propaganda, and influencing public opinion.
A special dimension is represented by political and media narratives originating from Serbia, especially those related to Kosovo, interethnic relations and security.
Internationally, Russia, China and other state and non-state actors have faced evidence-based accusations of conducting influence operations. Artificial intelligence is fundamentally transforming the way information is produced and distributed, creating opportunities for technological development, but also for manipulation, propaganda and interference in democratic processes.
Hybrid warfare combines military and non-military instruments, including cyberattacks, sabotage, economic pressure, and information manipulation. Within this strategy, disinformation aims to influence how citizens understand events and make decisions.
Rather than changing events, information operations try to change their interpretation. The goal is not necessarily to convince the public of a lie, but to sow doubt in all information. When videos are labeled as fabricated and journalistic reports are labeled as propaganda, even documented facts have a harder time gaining public trust.
This threat goes beyond fake news, because it undermines society’s ability to debate on verifiable facts. Manipulation not only aims to change political beliefs, but also to gradually weaken trust in institutions, media, and sources of information.
Reports from European institutions and technology companies show that information manipulation operations have become increasingly sophisticated, more organised and more difficult to identify. In its fourth report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), published in March 2026, the European External Action Service (EEAS) found that during 2025 these operations had reached new levels of complexity and international scope, proving that information manipulation can no longer be treated solely as a communication problem or as the usual spread of fake news.
According to this report, information interventions have become part of a broader hybrid arsenal, where digital activities can be combined with political pressure, threats and destabilizing actions to achieve strategic objectives. This means that a disinformation operation may not be an isolated activity, but part of a strategy aimed at weakening institutions, deepening social divisions or influencing the political orientation of a country.
Russia represents one of the most well-documented cases of the use of information influence operations to advance geopolitical objectives. Since the beginning of the large-scale invasion of Ukraine, networks linked to Russian interests have been identified in campaigns aimed at discrediting Ukraine, weakening Western support for Kiev, and deepening political divisions within democratic societies. These operations are not limited to promoting narratives favorable to Moscow, but also include efforts to create distrust of Western institutions and influence the way the public interprets international developments.
The EEAS’s third report, published in March 2025, identified the digital infrastructure used by foreign actors, mainly from Russia and China, to interfere in the information space of the European Union and partner countries. The methods documented include the creation of websites that imitate well-known media outlets, the use of fake profiles on social networks, and the coordinated distribution of content intended to appear as independent reporting, making it more difficult for users to identify the true source of information.
Artificial intelligence significantly expands these capacities, because it enables the production of large amounts of content in different languages, the adaptation of messages according to the characteristics of the audience and their distribution with less time and human resources. In this way, a single narrative can be presented in different forms for different social groups, creating the impression of a broad and spontaneous debate, even when the content originates from a coordinated operation.
During the 2024 U.S. presidential election, Microsoft’s Threat Analysis Center documented influence efforts by actors affiliated with Russia, Iran, and China, including the use of fabricated videos, artificial intelligence-generated content, and cyber operations targeting the election information environment. However, these cases do not prove that foreign interference determined the outcome of the election, but they do show that digital manipulation has become a tool used to influence political debate and public perceptions.
Another concern is the use of artificial intelligence to mimic the identity and authority of real people. Deepfake technology enables the creation of videos and audio recordings that convincingly depict individuals saying or doing things that never happened, and in polarized political environments such material can trigger immediate reactions before their authenticity can be verified.
However, the risk lies not only in the possibility of fabricating evidence, but also in the fact that the spread of content created with artificial intelligence can allow individuals or institutions to dismiss authentic material, claiming that it is manipulated. This phenomenon, known in disinformation studies as the liar’s dividend, creates an advantage for those seeking to avoid responsibility, because the more fabricated material circulates in the public space, the easier it becomes to cast doubt on even real evidence.
In this way, information manipulation can work in two directions simultaneously, making lies seem credible and the truth seem suspicious, which constitutes one of the most serious challenges for journalism, institutions, and democratic debate.
Automation through artificial intelligence further strengthens this mechanism, as influence networks can produce thousands of variants of the same narrative and adapt them to the language, culture, and concerns of different audiences. OpenAI’s February 2026 report on malicious uses of artificial intelligence found that threat actors typically combine AI models with traditional tools, including websites and social media accounts, while their operations can span multiple platforms and use different technological models.
This shows that artificial intelligence has not replaced traditional propaganda, but has accelerated and expanded it, enabling actors conducting influence operations to produce more content and target wider audiences.
China represents another dimension of digital competition, as reports by Microsoft and the EEAS have identified operations linked to Chinese actors that aim to influence international perceptions, exploit societal polarization, and promote narratives in line with Beijing’s strategic interests. Although the methods and objectives of these operations differ from those related to Russia, both cases demonstrate that the information space has become an arena of strategic competition between great powers.
For the Western Balkans, these developments are of particular importance, as the Region continues to grapple with ethnic tensions, political disputes, external influences, and debates over Euro-Atlantic orientation. In such an environment, a fabricated statement by an official, a doctored video of protests, or a false report about a security incident can create uncertainty and provoke public reactions before the facts are verified.
A particularly sensitive dimension of this confrontation is related to the relations between Serbia and Kosovo, where political disagreements, tensions due to illegal Serbian structures influenced by Belgrade have created a favorable environment for the spread of disinformation.
Research published during 2026 shows that narratives originating from Serbian and Russian sources continue to be an important part of the Kosovo information environment. These narratives often focus on interethnic relations, the security of the Serbian community, the actions of Kosovo institutions and the role of international actors, while the way they are presented can create the impression of a broader crisis than that supported by verified facts.
One of the most significant research studies was published on March 27, 2026 by BIRN Kosova and Internews Kosova, under the title Mapping Disinformation: Russian and Serbian Narratives in the Media and Social Networks in Kosovo.
The study analyzed how misleading narratives, mainly from Russian and Serbian sources, exploit interethnic tensions, fuel insecurity, and weaken social cohesion. The researchers monitored four Kremlin-controlled media outlets that published 1,323 pieces of material about Kosovo between September 2025 and February 2026, as well as 150 social media platforms and accounts, identifying over 20 suspicious links. Of the collected material, 2,361 articles were selected for in-depth analysis.
This data shows that informational influence is not limited to a political statement or a piece of false news published in isolation, but can develop through an ecosystem of media outlets, platforms, and accounts that reproduce similar narratives. When a claim is repeated by multiple sources, it can gain visibility and credibility in the eyes of the public, even in cases where these sources do not provide independent evidence of its veracity.
A concrete example from 2026 is related to the debate over the Law on Foreigners in Kosovo, which became part of the political and informational clash between Pristina and Belgrade. During the UN Security Council meeting on April 9, Serbian Foreign Minister Marko Djuric made allegations of arbitrary arrests, institutional pressure and the expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo, while the Russian representative, Vassily Nebenzia, accused Kosovo institutions of policies that, according to him, aimed at ethnic cleansing of the non-Albanian population in the north. In an analysis published on May 6, BIRN journalists in Pristina Insight argued that these allegations were based on repeated narratives and that the interpretation of the Law on Foreigners as an instrument for the expulsion of Serbs did not reflect the administrative character of the legal measures.
The significance of this case also lies in the way in which statements made at an international forum were reproduced in the Serbian media space. According to BIRN’s research, the Serbian public broadcaster RTS and other media outlets, including Pink.rs, gave space to claims about the expulsion of Serbs and the ongoing pressure on them. Thus, a political interpretation presented to the Security Council can become a continuously circulating media narrative, influencing not only the public in Serbia, but also the Serbian community in Kosovo and international audiences who do not have direct knowledge of the situation on the ground.
Another example relates to the way security issues and military cooperation in the Region are presented in some Serbian and Russian media. In February 2026, the fact-checking platform The Geopost analyzed reports that presented military cooperation between Kosovo, Albania and Croatia through threatening interpretations towards Serbia. In other cases, documented in August, portals such as Sputnik and RT Balkan used alarmist formulations about developments in northern Kosovo, including property issues in the Ujman area and the situation near the bridge over the Ibar River. These examples illustrate how administrative, political or security developments can be presented in such a way as to reinforce the perception of a persistent threat.
The risk is even greater when these narratives are combined with manipulated visual content. In September 2026, The Geopost identified a case on Instagram where footage from Pristina was falsely presented as a movement towards North Mitrovica. In an environment where interethnic tensions can be escalated by inaccurate information, changing the context of a video can create the impression of a new security development, even when the footage does not prove what is claimed. This case does not prove the use of artificial intelligence, but it shows that context manipulation remains an important tool of disinformation, which new technologies can make even more convincing.
Meanwhile, the use of artificial intelligence in Kosovo’s information space is no longer just a theoretical possibility. In an analysis published in April 2026, the European Union Office in Kosovo referred to a Hibrid.info report on disinformation during the recent 2025 electoral processes, noting that in addition to fake news, fabricated polls and unverified statements, an increasing use of content created with artificial intelligence was also observed. The report also identified narratives disseminated by Serbian and Russian media in the Serbian language, which aimed to influence public debate, increase polarization and question the legitimacy of Kosovo’s institutions.
Sbunker’s monitoring for the period January–March 2026 also highlighted the intensification of disinformation, the use of increasingly sophisticated manipulation techniques, the increase in propaganda on Telegram, and the emergence of misleading content created with artificial intelligence. According to this monitoring, the use of emotional and divisive language was another characteristic of content aimed at influencing public debate.
These developments show that for Kosovo the challenge is not only related to opposing a particular political narrative coming from Serbia or Russia, but to building capacities to identify how manipulative content is produced, disseminated and reinforced. In an information space where political statements can be reproduced by multiple media, where authentic images can be taken out of context and where artificial intelligence can create materials that appear credible, fact-checking becomes an important part of democratic security.
For Kosovo, protecting against information manipulation is not only a matter of responding to foreign propaganda, but also of strengthening independent journalism, institutional transparency and public trust. In an environment where false information can spread within minutes, while its verification requires time and evidence, the ability to protect the credibility of facts becomes as important as the ability to identify the source of manipulation. (Telegrafi)